LEADER 03877nam 2200625 450 001 9910814072103321 005 20200520144314.0 024 7 $a10.7312/milg17598 035 $a(CKB)3710000001386335 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5276090 035 $a(DE-B1597)482786 035 $a(OCoLC)969973847 035 $a(OCoLC)984657523 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780231544573 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5267898 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5276090 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11529608 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5267898 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL1006892 035 $a(OCoLC)1024280488 035 $z(PPN)233900098 035 $a(PPN)201890933 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000001386335 100 $a20180326h20172017 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 10$aDiscovering prices $eauction design in markets with complex constraints /$fPaul Milgrom 210 1$aNew York :$cColumbia University Press,$d2017. 210 4$dİ2017 215 $a1 online resource (247 pages) 225 0 $aKenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series 311 $a0-231-17598-1 311 $a0-231-54457-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $t1. Introduction -- $t2. (Near-)Substitutes, Prices, and Stability -- $t3. Vickrey Auctions and Substitution -- $t4. Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Near-Substitutes -- $t5. Conclusion -- $tNotes -- $tReferences -- $tIndex 330 $aTraditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith's famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What's needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied.In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom-the world's most frequently cited academic expert on auction design-describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world's growing complex resource allocation problems. 606 $aAuction theory 606 $aAuctions$xMathematical models 606 $aPrices$xMathematical models 615 0$aAuction theory. 615 0$aAuctions$xMathematical models. 615 0$aPrices$xMathematical models. 676 $a381/.1701 686 $aQH 430$2rvk 700 $aMilgrom$b Paul R$g(Paul Robert),$f1948-$0116237 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910814072103321 996 $aDiscovering prices$93958685 997 $aUNINA