LEADER 05235nam 2200673 a 450 001 9910813420503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-15875-9 010 $a9786612158759 010 $a1-4008-3013-3 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400830138 035 $a(CKB)1000000000788552 035 $a(EBL)457722 035 $a(OCoLC)436086269 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000125620 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11133560 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000125620 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10029846 035 $a(PQKB)10758471 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36435 035 $a(DE-B1597)446475 035 $a(OCoLC)979685619 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400830138 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL457722 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10312461 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL215875 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC457722 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000788552 100 $a20020521d2002 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCommon value auctions and the winner's curse /$fJohn H. Kagel and Dan Levin 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc2002 215 $a1 online resource (420 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-01667-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $tCredits -- $t1 Bidding in Common-Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research / $rKagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- $t2 First-Price Common-Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the "Winner's Curse" / $rKagel, John H. / Levin, Dan / Battalio, Raymond C. / Meyer, Donald J. -- $t3 The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions / $rKagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- $t4 Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions / $rKagel, John H. / Levin, Dan / Harstad, Ronald M. -- $t5 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study / $rKagel, John H. / Harstad, Ronald M. / Levin, Dan -- $t6 Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions / $rLevin, Dan / Kagel, John H. / Richard, Jean-Francois -- $t7 Common Value Auctions with Insider Information / $rKagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- $t8 Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? / $rCampbell, Colin M. / Levin, Dan -- $t9 Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation / $rAvery, Christopher / Kagel, John H. -- $t10 Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations / $rGarvin, Susan / Kagel, John H. -- $t11 Cross-Game Learning: Experimental Evidence from First-Price and English Common Value Auctions / $rKagel, John H. -- $t12 A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis / $rDyer, Douglas / Kagel, John H. / Levin, Dan -- $t13 Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's Curse / $rDyer, Douglas / Kagel, John H. -- $tInstructions -- $tIndex 330 $aFew forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work. 606 $aAuctions 606 $aParadoxes 606 $aValue 615 0$aAuctions. 615 0$aParadoxes. 615 0$aValue. 676 $a381/.17 700 $aKagel$b John H$g(John Henry),$f1942-$0123413 701 $aLevin$b Dan$f1947-$01658419 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910813420503321 996 $aCommon value auctions and the winner's curse$94012409 997 $aUNINA