LEADER 06259nam 22009973u 450 001 9910813420203321 005 20240501054702.0 010 $a1-282-25913-X 010 $a9786612259135 010 $a1-4008-3036-2 035 $a(CKB)1000000000788553 035 $a(EBL)457805 035 $a(OCoLC)439825977 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000114159 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11139070 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000114159 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10102028 035 $a(PQKB)11573394 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001153761 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11758431 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001153761 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11153704 035 $a(PQKB)11687643 035 $a(PPN)170232042 035 $a(FR-PaCSA)88818849 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC457805 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000788553 100 $a20131216d2009|||| u|| | 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe Bounds of Reason $eGame Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aPrinceton $cPrinceton University Press$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (305 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-16084-8 311 $a0-691-14052-9 327 $aCover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; 1 Decision Theory and Human Behavior; 1.1 Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints; 1.2 The Meaning of Rational Action; 1.3 Why Are Preferences Consistent?; 1.4 Time Inconsistency; 1.5 Bayesian Rationality and Subjective Priors; 1.6 The Biological Basis for Expected Utility; 1.7 The Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes; 1.8 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function; 1.9 Prospect Theory; 1.10 Heuristics and Biases in Decision Making; 2 Game Theory: Basic Concepts; 2.1 The Extensive Form; 2.2 The Normal Form; 2.3 Mixed Strategies; 2.4 Nash Equilibrium 327 $a2.5 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory2.6 Solving for Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria; 2.7 Throwing Fingers; 2.8 The Battle of the Sexes; 2.9 The Hawk- Dove Game; 2.10 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 2.11 Alice, Bob, and the Choreographer; 2.12 An Efficiency-Enhancing Choreographer; 2.13 The Correlated Equilibrium Solution Concept; 3 Game Theory and Human Behavior; 3.1 Self- and Other-Regarding Preferences; 3.2 Methodological Issues in Behavioral Game Theory; 3.3 An Anonymous Market Exchange; 3.4 The Rationality of Altruistic Giving; 3.5 Conditional Altruistic Cooperation 327 $a3.6 Altruistic Punishment3.7 Strong Reciprocity in the Labor Market; 3.8 Altruistic Third-Party Punishment; 3.9 Altruism and Cooperation in Groups; 3.10 Inequality Aversion; 3.11 The Trust Game; 3.12 Character Virtues; 3.13 The Situational Character of Preferences; 3.14 The Dark Side of Altruistic Cooperation; 3.15 Norms of Cooperation: Cross-Cultural Variation; 4 Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality; 4.1 Epistemic Games; 4.2 A Simple Epistemic Game; 4.3 An Epistemic Battle of the Sexes; 4.4 Dominated and Iteratedly Dominated Strategies 327 $a4.5 Eliminating Weakly Dominated Strategies4.6 Rationalizable Strategies; 4.7 Eliminating Strongly Dominated Strategies; 4.8 Common Knowledge of Rationality; 4.9 Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality; 4.10 The Beauty Contest; 4.11 The Traveler's Dilemma; 4.12 The Modified Traveler's Dilemma; 4.13 Global Games; 4.14 CKR Is an Event, Not a Premise; 5 Extensive Form Rationalizability; 5.1 Backward Induction and Dominated Strategies; 5.2 Subgame Perfection; 5.3 Subgame Perfection and Incredible Threats; 5.4 The Surprise Examination; 5.5 The Common Knowledge of Logicality Paradox 327 $a5.6 The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma5.7 The Centipede Game; 5.8 CKR Fails Off the Backward Induction Path; 5.9 How to Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; 5.10 The Modal Logic of Knowledge; 5.11 Backward Induction and Extensive Form CKR; 5.12 Rationality and Extensive Form CKR; 5.13 On the Nonexistence of CKR; 6 The Mixing Problem: Purification and Conjectures; 6.1 Why Play Mixed Strategies?; 6.2 Harsanyi's Purification Theorem; 6.3 A Reputational Model of Honesty and Corruption; 6.4 Purifying Honesty and Corruption; 6.5 Epistemic Games: Mixed Strategies as Conjectures 327 $a6.6 Resurrecting the Conjecture Approach to Purification 330 $a Game theory is central to understanding human behavior and relevant to all of the behavioral sciences--from biology and economics, to anthropology and political science. However, as The Bounds of Reason demonstrates, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. Herbert Gintis shows that just as game theory without broader social theory is merely technical bravado, so social theory without game theory is a handicapped enterprise. Gintis illustrates, for instance, that game theor 606 $aGame theory 606 $aHuman behavior 606 $aPractical reason 606 $aPsychology 606 $aSocial sciences --Methodology 606 $aGame theory$xMethodology 606 $aPractical reason 606 $aHuman behavior 606 $aSocial sciences 606 $aPsychology 606 $aBusiness & Economics$2HILCC 606 $aEconomic Theory$2HILCC 606 $aMathematics$2HILCC 606 $aPhysical Sciences & Mathematics$2HILCC 606 $aAlgebra$2HILCC 615 4$aGame theory. 615 4$aHuman behavior. 615 4$aPractical reason. 615 4$aPsychology. 615 4$aSocial sciences --Methodology. 615 0$aGame theory$xMethodology 615 0$aPractical reason 615 0$aHuman behavior 615 0$aSocial sciences 615 0$aPsychology 615 7$aBusiness & Economics 615 7$aEconomic Theory 615 7$aMathematics 615 7$aPhysical Sciences & Mathematics 615 7$aAlgebra 676 $a519.3 700 $aGintis$b Herbert$0147648 801 0$bAU-PeEL 801 1$bAU-PeEL 801 2$bAU-PeEL 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910813420203321 996 $aThe Bounds of Reason$94012406 997 $aUNINA