LEADER 03372nam 2200661Ia 450 001 9910813253003321 005 20240505201318.0 010 $a0-19-160946-3 010 $a0-19-180983-7 010 $a1-282-46581-3 010 $a9786612465819 010 $a0-19-157291-8 035 $a(CKB)2550000000006680 035 $a(EBL)480654 035 $a(OCoLC)536370649 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000344629 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11301480 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000344629 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10306975 035 $a(PQKB)10612992 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001138883 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC480654 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL480654 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10362190 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL246581 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC7036249 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL7036249 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000006680 100 $a20090907d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe world in the head /$fRobert Cummins 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aOxford $cOxford University Press$dc2010 215 $a1 online resource (339 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-19-954804-8 311 $a0-19-954803-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aContents; 1. What is it Like to be a Computer?; 2. The LOT of the Causal Theory of Mental Content; 3. Systematicity; 4. Systematicity and the Cognition of Structured Domains; 5. Methodological Reflections on Belief; 6. Inexplicit Information; 7. Representation and Indication; 8. Representation and Unexploited Content; 9. Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality; 10. Truth and Meaning; 11. Meaning and Content in Cognitive Science; 12. Representational Specialization: The Synthetic A Priori Revisited; 13. Biological Preparedness and Evolutionary Explanation 327 $a14. Cognitive Evolutionary Psychology Without Representational Nativism15. Connectionism and the Rationale Constraint on Cognitive Explanation; 16. 'How does it Work?' vs. 'What are the Laws?': Two Conceptions of Psychological Explanation; Bibliography; Name Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; V; W; Y; Subject Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; V 330 $aThe World in the Head collects the best of Robert Cummins' papers on mental representation and psychological explanation. Running through these papers are a pair of themes: that explaining the mind requires functional analysis, not subsumption under ""psychological laws"", and that the propositional attitudes--belief, desire, intention--and their interactions, while real, are not the key to understanding the mind at a fundamental level. Taking these ideas seriously putsconsiderable strain on standard conceptions of rationality and reasoning, on truth-conditional semantics, and on our interpret 606 $aMental representation 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 615 0$aMental representation. 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 676 $a128.2 700 $aCummins$b Robert$f1944-$053657 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910813253003321 996 $aThe world in the head$93924737 997 $aUNINA