LEADER 04419nam 2200721 450 001 9910813121903321 005 20230126204251.0 010 $a0-8014-7102-8 010 $a0-8014-7929-0 010 $a0-8014-7103-6 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801471032 035 $a(CKB)2560000000125891 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001195880 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11949196 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001195880 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11161928 035 $a(PQKB)11785925 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138598 035 $a(OCoLC)1080549719 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse58393 035 $a(DE-B1597)496610 035 $a(OCoLC)879372072 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801471032 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138598 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10863984 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL683550 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000125891 100 $a20140502h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aNetworks of rebellion $eexplaining insurgent cohesion and collapse /$fPaul Staniland 210 1$aIthaca, New York ;$aLondon, England :$cCornell University Press,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (313 pages) $cillustrations, tables 225 1 $aCornell Studies in Security Affairs 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-322-52268-5 311 $a0-8014-5266-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tList of Tables --$tAcknowledgments --$t1. Organizing Insurgency --$tPart I. Theorizing Rebellion --$t2. Insurgent Origins --$t3. Insurgent Change --$tPart II. Comparative Evidence from South Asia --$t4. Azad and Jihad: Trajectories of Insurgency in Kashmir --$t5. Organizing Rebellion in Afghanistan --$t6. Explaining Tamil Militancy in Sri Lanka --$tPart III. Extensions and Implications --$t7. "Peasants and Commissars": Communist Tides in Southeast Asia --$t8. Insurgency, War, and Politics --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aThe organizational cohesion of insurgent groups is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes. Cohesive insurgent groups produce more effective war-fighting forces and are more credible negotiators; organizational cohesion shapes both the duration of wars and their ultimate resolution. In Networks of Rebellion, Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their ability to build strong organizations and why the cohesion of armed groups changes over time during conflicts. He outlines a new way of thinking about the sources and structure of insurgent groups, distinguishing among integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented groups. Staniland compares insurgent groups, their differing social bases, and how the nature of the coalitions and networks within which these armed groups were built has determined their discipline and internal control. He examines insurgent groups in Afghanistan, 1975 to the present day, Kashmir (1988-2003), Sri Lanka from the 1970's to the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009, and several communist uprisings in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. The initial organization of an insurgent group depends on the position of its leaders in prewar political networks. These social bases shape what leaders can and cannot do when they build a new insurgent group. Counterinsurgency, insurgent strategy, and international intervention can cause organizational change. During war, insurgent groups are embedded in social ties that determine they how they organize, fight, and negotiate; as these ties shift, organizational structure changes as well. 410 0$aCornell studies in security affairs. 606 $aInsurgency$vCross-cultural studies 606 $aSocial networks$vCross-cultural studies 606 $aInsurgency$zSouth Asia$vCase studies 606 $aInsurgency$zSoutheast Asia$vCase studies 615 0$aInsurgency 615 0$aSocial networks 615 0$aInsurgency 615 0$aInsurgency 676 $a303.6/4 686 $aLB 42330$qDE-14/sred$2rvk 700 $aStaniland$b Paul$f1982-$0783034 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910813121903321 996 $aNetworks of rebellion$91739151 997 $aUNINA