LEADER 00844nam0-22003131i-450- 001 990003343210403321 005 20080423111056.0 035 $a000334321 035 $aFED01000334321 035 $a(Aleph)000334321FED01 035 $a000334321 100 $a20030910d1981----km-y0itay50------ba 101 0 $aeng 102 $aHK 105 $ay-------001yy 200 1 $a<>hobbit$bnotes$cby Geoffrey M. Ridden$fJ. R. R. Tolkien 210 $aHarlow$cLongman$d1981 215 $a70 p.$d21 cm 225 1 $aYork notes 610 0 $aChildren's stories in English 676 $a823.9 700 1$aTolkien,$bJohn Ronald Reuel$f<1892-1973>$0163552 801 0$aIT$bUNINA$gRICA$2UNIMARC 901 $aBK 912 $a990003343210403321 952 $a823.9 TOL$b1162$fDECLI 959 $aDECLI 996 $aHobbit$9442725 997 $aUNINA LEADER 02878nam 2200565 450 001 9910812590703321 005 20230803032429.0 010 $a3-89785-949-1 024 7 $a10.30965/9783897859494 035 $a(CKB)2670000000598877 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001463150 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12560801 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001463150 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11419935 035 $a(PQKB)10067598 035 $a(nllekb)BRILL9783897859494 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5055734 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6518069 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL5055734 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL733997 035 $a(OCoLC)1011164954 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6518069 035 $a(OCoLC)1243547608 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000598877 100 $a20211015d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurun| uuuua 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aI know $emodal epistemology and scepticism /$fWolfgang Freitag 210 1$aMu?nster :$cMentis,$d[2013] 210 4$dİ2013 215 $a1 online resource 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a3-89785-774-X 311 $a1-336-02711-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 185-191) and index. 330 $aScepticism, the view that knowledge is impossible, threatens our conception of ourselves as epistemic subjects as much as it endangers our conception of the external world. The book develops a modal account of knowledge and provides an answer to scepticism based on a detailed examination of the main sceptical argument. It discusses prominent contemporary theories of knowledge, in particular safety and sensitivity theories, and shows that they cannot handle Gettier-type examples of a new kind. An alternative analysis of knowledge in terms of relevantly normal possibilities is developed. The sceptical argument addressed aims to show that we cannot know ordinary things because we cannot rule out that we are in a sceptical scenario. Classical responses, like dogmatism, non-closure theories, and epistemic contextualism, are explored and rejected as unnecessary for a refutation of the sceptical argument. A detailed investigation reveals, first, that the failure to know that we are not in a sceptical scenario does not conflict with ordinary knowledge, but only with knowledge that we know, and, second, that we can indeed know that we are not in a sceptical scenario. It is therefore claimed not only that we know, but also that we know that we know. 606 $aModality (Theory of knowledge) 615 0$aModality (Theory of knowledge) 676 $a123 700 $aFreitag$b Wolfgang$f1972-$01665371 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910812590703321 996 $aI know$94023945 997 $aUNINA