LEADER 03623nam 22005652 450 001 9910812144403321 005 20200127021200.0 010 $a981-4843-54-7 024 7 $a10.1355/9789814843546 035 $a(CKB)4100000008274777 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5775076 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9789814843546 035 $a(OCoLC)1136278004 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse82716 035 $a(DE-B1597)528529 035 $a(OCoLC)1102472499 035 $a(DE-B1597)9789814843546 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000008274777 100 $a20191218d2019|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aFrom declaration to code $econtinuity and change in China's engagement with ASEAN on the South China Sea /$fHoang Thi Ha$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aSingapore :$cISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute,$d2019. 215 $a1 online resource (37 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aTrends in Southeast Asia ;$v2019 no. 5 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 27 Jan 2020). 311 0 $a981-4843-53-9 327 $tFront matter --$tFOREWORD --$tEXECUTIVE SUMMARY --$tINTRODUCTION --$tI. CHINA'S MOTIVATIONS IN ENGAGING WITH ASEAN ON THE SCS --$tII. CHINA'S STANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOC --$tIII. CHINA'S NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOUR ON THE COC --$tIV. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE --$tCONCLUSION 330 $aChina's engagement with ASEAN over the South China Sea, from the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea to the ongoing negotiations on the Code of Conduct (COC), exhibits a dynamic continuum with two constants: 1. Dismissal of any legally binding instrument that would constrain China's freedom of action; and 2. Persistent territorialization of the SCS despite Beijing's simultaneous diplomatic engagement with ASEAN. The continuity is juxtaposed with elements of change in China's engagement with ASEAN, as afforded by the former's growing power and influence. This metamorphosis is manifested in China's efforts to undermine ASEAN unity, robustly assert its claims in the SCS, and use economic statecraft towards ASEAN member states in return for their acquiescence. China's more "active" engagement in the COC over the past three years is tactical and does not signify a fundamental change in its long-term strategy that seeks to eventually establish its sovereignty and control over the SCS based on the nine-dash-line (NDL). The divergent positions between China and some ASEAN member states on the COC, especially its scope of application, self-restraint elements, legal status and dispute settlement mechanism, are not easy to reconcile. The COC may end up being a non-binding political document with a general scope of application, which will have little effect in regulating the contracting parties' behaviour. 410 0$aTrends in Southeast Asia ;$v2019 no. 5. 606 $aLaw of the sea$zSouth China Sea 606 $aDispute resolution (Law)$zSoutheast Asia 607 $aSouth China Sea$xInternational status 607 $aSoutheast Asia$xForeign relations$zChina 607 $aChina$xForeign relations$zSoutheast Asia 607 $aSouth China Sea$xClaims 615 0$aLaw of the sea 615 0$aDispute resolution (Law) 676 $a341.4480916472 700 $aHa$b Hoang Thi$01692737 712 02$aISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910812144403321 996 $aFrom declaration to code$94070031 997 $aUNINA