LEADER 03606nam  2200757Ia 450 
001 9910811940903321
005 20200520144314.0
010   $a1-107-16145-2
010   $a1-280-48029-7
010   $a0-511-22048-0
010   $a0-511-22099-5
010   $a0-511-21900-8
010   $a0-511-30896-5
010   $a0-511-75425-6
010   $a0-511-21968-7
035   $a(CKB)1000000000353024
035   $a(EBL)261102
035   $a(OCoLC)252521752
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000137377
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)11134644
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000137377
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10088094
035   $a(PQKB)10036214
035   $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511754258
035   $a(Au-PeEL)EBL261102
035   $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10130414
035   $a(CaONFJC)MIL48029
035   $a(OCoLC)173610029
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC261102
035   $a(PPN)26136247X
035   $a(EXLCZ)991000000000353024
100   $a20051129d2006      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aDesigning economic mechanisms /$fLeonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter
205   $a1st ed.
210   $aCambridge ;$aNew York $cCambridge University Press$d2006
215   $a1 online resource (ix, 344 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-72410-4 
311   $a0-521-83641-7 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 335-340) and index.
327   $aCover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgements; Introduction; One Mechanisms and Mechanism Design; Two From Goals to Means: Constructing Mechanisms; Three Designing Informationally Efficient Mechanisms Using the Language of Sets; Four Revelation Mechanisms; References; Index
330   $aA mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
606   $aEconomics, Mathematical
606   $aEconomics$xMathematical models
606   $aMathematical optimization
606   $aGame theory
615  0$aEconomics, Mathematical.
615  0$aEconomics$xMathematical models.
615  0$aMathematical optimization.
615  0$aGame theory.
676   $a330.01/5195
686   $a83.03$2bcl
700   $aHurwicz$b Leonid$0104011
701   $aReiter$b Stanley$0614513
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910811940903321
996   $aDesigning economic mechanisms$91131337
997   $aUNINA