LEADER 03891nam 2200697Ia 450 001 9910811533703321 005 20240418003707.0 010 $a1-282-35279-2 010 $a9786612352799 010 $a0-300-14868-2 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300148688 035 $a(CKB)2420000000001351 035 $a(StDuBDS)BDZ0022171536 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000336137 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11260775 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000336137 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10278538 035 $a(PQKB)10041255 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000158245 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3420586 035 $a(DE-B1597)485344 035 $a(OCoLC)587634199 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300148688 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3420586 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10348483 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL235279 035 $a(OCoLC)923594788 035 $a(EXLCZ)992420000000001351 100 $a20090908d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aConstitutional courts and democratic values$b[electronic resource] $ea European perspective /$fVi?ctor Ferreres Comella 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aNew Haven ;$aLondon $cYale University Press$dc2009 215 $a1 online resource (1 online resource (xvi, 238 p.)) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-300-14867-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 159-222) and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIntroduction -- $t1. The Rise of Constitutional Courts -- $t2. Historical Background: The Principle of Separation of Powers -- $t3. A Traditional Justification: Legal Certainty -- $t4. The Justification of Constitutional Review: The Sketch of an Argument -- $t5. The Special Nature of Constitutional Discourse -- $t6. The Structure of the Constitutional Conversation -- $t7. Overcoming Judicial Timidity -- $t8. The Democratic Objection to Constitutional Review -- $t9. Democratic Checks on Courts -- $t10. Decentralizing Tendencies in the System -- $t11. The Impact of the European Court of Justice -- $t12. The Impact of the European Court of Human Rights -- $tAfterword -- $tNotes -- $tIndex 330 $aIn this book, Víctor Ferreres Comella contrasts the European "centralized" constitutional court model, in which one court system is used to adjudicate constitutional questions, with a decentralized model, such as that of the United States, in which courts deal with both constitutional and nonconstitutional questions. Comella's systematic exploration of the reasons for and against the creation of constitutional courts is rich in detail and offers an ambitious theory to justify the European preference for them. Based on extensive research on eighteen European countries, Comella finds that centralized review fits well with the civil law tradition and structures of ordinary adjudication in those countries. Comella concludes that-while the decentralized model works for the United States-there is more than one way to preserve democratic values and that these values are best preserved in the parliamentary democracies of Europe through constitutional courts. 517 3 $aConstitutional courts & democratic values 606 $aConstitutional courts$zEurope 606 $aConstitutional courts$zUnited States 606 $aJudicial review$zEurope 606 $aJudicial review$zUnited States 615 0$aConstitutional courts 615 0$aConstitutional courts 615 0$aJudicial review 615 0$aJudicial review 676 $a347.4035 700 $aFerreres Comella$b Vi?ctor$0522665 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910811533703321 996 $aConstitutional courts and democratic values$93961200 997 $aUNINA