LEADER 05561oam 22012614 450 001 9910811443903321 005 20240410162637.0 010 $a1-4623-4778-9 010 $a1-4519-9338-2 010 $a1-283-51351-X 010 $a9786613825964 010 $a1-4519-0940-3 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443588 035 $a(EBL)3014442 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000939916 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11502257 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000939916 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10938658 035 $a(PQKB)11541907 035 $a(OCoLC)694141096 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006227 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014442 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443588 100 $a20020129d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy : $eSurvey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence /$fBernard Laurens, Marco Arnone, Jean-François Segalotto 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006. 215 $a1 online resource (85 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"October 2006." 311 $a1-4518-6487-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p.79-85). 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION TO INDICATORS OF CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY""; ""II. BASE INDICATORS OF DE JURE AUTONOMY""; ""III. SUBSEQUENT LITERATURE AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON BASE INDICATORS""; ""IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""Appendix I. Statistical Tables""; ""Appendix II. Summary of Base Indicators of De Jure Autonomy Robin Bade, Michael Parkin ( 1977).""; ""Appendix III. Summary of Base Indicators of De Facto Autonomy Alex Cukierman ( 1992).""; ""Appendix IV. Summary of Empirical Studies on De Jure Autonomy""; ""Appendix V. Summary of Empirical Studies on De Facto Autonomy""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aThis paper presents a survey of the literature on the measurement of central bank autonomy. We distinguish inputs that constitute the building blocks in the literature, and the literature that builds on them. Issues including sensitivity analysis, robustness, and endogeneity are discussed. The review shows that empirical evidence regarding the beneficial effects of central bank autonomy is substantial, although some technical issues still remain for further research. In particular, central bank autonomy raises the issue of subjecting the monetary authorities to democratic control; this calls for additional research on the linkages between central bank autonomy and accountability and transparency. Additional empirical analysis on the relationship between the financial strength of the central bank and its de facto autonomy, and between its autonomy and financial stability, would also be desirable. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/227 606 $aBanks and banking, Central$xManagement$xEconometric models 606 $aMonetary policy$xEconometric models 606 $aInflation$2imf 606 $aLabor$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aPublic Finance$2imf 606 $aPrice Level$2imf 606 $aDeflation$2imf 606 $aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General$2imf 606 $aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy$2imf 606 $aDebt$2imf 606 $aDebt Management$2imf 606 $aSovereign Debt$2imf 606 $aCentral Banks and Their Policies$2imf 606 $aMonetary Policy$2imf 606 $aPublic finance & taxation$2imf 606 $aLabour$2imf 606 $aincome economics$2imf 606 $aLegal support in revenue administration$2imf 606 $aPrice stabilization$2imf 606 $aWage bargaining$2imf 606 $aGovernment debt management$2imf 606 $aPrices$2imf 606 $aRevenue administration$2imf 606 $aPublic financial management (PFM)$2imf 606 $aRevenue$2imf 606 $aGovernment policy$2imf 606 $aWages$2imf 606 $aDebts, Public$2imf 607 $aUnited States$2imf 615 0$aBanks and banking, Central$xManagement$xEconometric models. 615 0$aMonetary policy$xEconometric models. 615 7$aInflation 615 7$aLabor 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aPublic Finance 615 7$aPrice Level 615 7$aDeflation 615 7$aTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General 615 7$aWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy 615 7$aDebt 615 7$aDebt Management 615 7$aSovereign Debt 615 7$aCentral Banks and Their Policies 615 7$aMonetary Policy 615 7$aPublic finance & taxation 615 7$aLabour 615 7$aincome economics 615 7$aLegal support in revenue administration 615 7$aPrice stabilization 615 7$aWage bargaining 615 7$aGovernment debt management 615 7$aPrices 615 7$aRevenue administration 615 7$aPublic financial management (PFM) 615 7$aRevenue 615 7$aGovernment policy 615 7$aWages 615 7$aDebts, Public 700 $aLaurens$b Bernard$01599076 701 $aArnone$b Marco$0120033 701 $aSegalotto$b Jean-François$01603471 712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bMonetary and Capital Markets Dept. 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910811443903321 996 $aThe Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy$93927853 997 $aUNINA