LEADER 04262nam 2200529 450 001 9910811421203321 005 20230612173719.0 010 $a0-292-74970-8 024 7 $a10.7560/724259 035 $a(CKB)3710000001085414 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4825858 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4825858 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11507323 035 $a(OCoLC)1022789675 035 $a(DE-B1597)587063 035 $a(OCoLC)1280943204 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780292749702 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000001085414 100 $a20180226h19781978 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 10$aForeign policy and economic dependence /$fNeil R. Richardson 210 1$aAustin, [Texas] :$cUniversity of Texas Press,$d1978. 210 4$dİ1978 215 $a1 online resource (225 pages) $cillustrations 300 $aIncludes index. 311 0 $a0-292-74159-6 311 0 $a0-292-72425-X 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tFigures -- $tTables -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tForeign Policy and Economic Dependence -- $t1. Introduction -- $t2. International Economic Dependence -- $t3. Foreign Policy Compliance -- $t4. United States Economic Dependencies -- $t5. Compliance in the General Assembly -- $t6. Theoretical and Policy Implications -- $tNotes -- $tIndex 330 $aIn an era of increasing interdependence among nations, the foreign policies of poor countries are becoming a subject of critical interest to scholars and the public alike. Neil R. Richardson adopts a political economy perspective to examine the foreign policy repercussions of international economic dependence.Are dependent countries compliant in their foreign policies, acquiescing to the preferences of the industrial giants on which they rely for foreign trade, investment, and aid revenues? Or are they instead prepared to defy their dominant economic partners? These are the major concerns of Richardson's rigorous investigation.The book begins with a characterization of economic dependence and its possible impact on the foreign policy decisions of dependent governments. Ideas from both "interdependence" and dependencia scholarship are extracted in order to explain the reliance of poor countries on their rich partners. These economics are linked to the foreign policies of poorer countries by considering how the mechanisms of dependence may create pressures on foreign policymakers. Several combinations of pressures are plausible, and each set yields a differing expectation about their foreign policies.The second part of the book is an empirical test of these foreign policy predictions for the years 1950-1973. Richardson analyzes the foreign policy behavior (as reflected in certain votes in the United Nations General Assembly) of a number of poor countries that are economically dependent on the United States to varying degrees.The results suggest several surprising conclusions. Contrary to one common assumption, these mostly Latin American and Caribbean countries are not necessarily locked into a condition of perpetual dependence. Richardson finds that the foreign policies of the economic dependencies are not easily manipulated by the United States. Not only do annual changes in their external economic reliance fail to correspond to their U.N. voting behavior, but the dependencies as a group are no longer clear voting allies of the United States after the late 1960s. These and other results bear theoretical and policy implications that conclude the book.Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence will be of interest to specialists in quantitative international relations and American foreign policy. 517 3 $aForeign policy & economic dependence 606 $aInternational economic relations 607 $aDeveloping countries$xEconomic policy 607 $aDeveloping countries$xForeign relations 615 0$aInternational economic relations. 676 $a338.9/009172/4 700 $aRichardson$b Neil R.$f1944-$0502333 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910811421203321 996 $aForeign policy and economic dependence$9733657 997 $aUNINA LEADER 04649nam 22006615 450 001 9910299269703321 005 20251113203951.0 010 $a3-319-77965-6 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-319-77965-2 035 $a(CKB)4100000003359567 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5438768 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-319-77965-2 035 $a(PPN)226699218 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000003359567 100 $a20180424d2018 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aData Privacy Games /$fby Lei Xu, Chunxiao Jiang, Yi Qian, Yong Ren 205 $a1st ed. 2018. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2018. 215 $a1 online resource (187 pages) 311 08$a3-319-77964-8 327 $a1 The Conflict between Big Data and Individual Privacy -- 2 Privacy-Preserving Data Collecting: A Simple Game Theoretic Approach -- 3 Contract-based Private Data Collecting -- 4 Dynamic Privacy Pricing -- 5 User Participation Game in Collaborative Filtering -- 6 Privacy-Accuracy Trade-off in Distributed Data Mining -- 7 Conclusion. 330 $aWith the growing popularity of ?big data?, the potential value of personal data has attracted more and more attention. Applications built on personal data can create tremendous social and economic benefits. Meanwhile, they bring serious threats to individual privacy. The extensive collection, analysis and transaction of personal data make it difficult for an individual to keep the privacy safe. People now show more concerns about privacy than ever before. How to make a balance between the exploitation of personal information and the protection of individual privacy has become an urgent issue. In this book, the authors use methodologies from economics, especially game theory, to investigate solutions to the balance issue. They investigate the strategies of stakeholders involved in the use of personal data, and try to find the equilibrium. The book proposes a user-role based methodology to investigate the privacy issues in data mining, identifying four different types of users, i.e. four user roles, involved in data mining applications. For each user role, the authors discuss its privacy concerns and the strategies that it can adopt to solve the privacy problems. The book also proposes a simple game model to analyze the interactions among data provider, data collector and data miner. By solving the equilibria of the proposed game, readers can get useful guidance on how to deal with the trade-off between privacy and data utility. Moreover, to elaborate the analysis on data collector?s strategies, the authors propose a contract model and a multi-armed bandit model respectively. The authors discuss how the owners of data (e.g. an individual or a data miner) deal with the trade-off between privacy and utility in data mining. Specifically, they study users? strategies in collaborative filtering based recommendation system and distributed classification system. They built game models to formulate the interactions among data owners, and propose learning algorithms to find the equilibria. 606 $aData structures (Computer science) 606 $aInformation theory 606 $aData mining 606 $aInformation storage and retrieval systems 606 $aElectronic data processing$xManagement 606 $aElectronic commerce 606 $aData Structures and Information Theory 606 $aData Mining and Knowledge Discovery 606 $aInformation Storage and Retrieval 606 $aIT Operations 606 $ae-Commerce and e-Business 615 0$aData structures (Computer science). 615 0$aInformation theory. 615 0$aData mining. 615 0$aInformation storage and retrieval systems. 615 0$aElectronic data processing$xManagement. 615 0$aElectronic commerce. 615 14$aData Structures and Information Theory. 615 24$aData Mining and Knowledge Discovery. 615 24$aInformation Storage and Retrieval. 615 24$aIT Operations. 615 24$ae-Commerce and e-Business. 676 $a005.73 700 $aXu$b Lei$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0892329 702 $aJiang$b Chunxiao$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 702 $aQian$b Yi$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 702 $aRen$b Yong$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910299269703321 996 $aData Privacy Games$91992604 997 $aUNINA