LEADER 03797nam 2200673Ia 450 001 9910811132503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-107-23659-2 010 $a1-107-35767-5 010 $a1-107-67098-5 010 $a1-139-20783-0 010 $a1-107-34805-6 010 $a1-107-34910-9 010 $a1-107-34180-9 010 $a1-107-34555-3 010 $a1-107-34430-1 035 $a(CKB)2550000001105945 035 $a(EBL)1139703 035 $a(OCoLC)852158119 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000857608 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11529734 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000857608 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10855516 035 $a(PQKB)10307694 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781139207836 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1139703 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1139703 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10729893 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL506196 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001105945 100 $a20120911d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aMaking constitutions $epresidents, parties, and institutional choice in Latin America /$fGabriel L. Negretto 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aCambridge ;$aNew York $cCambridge University Press$dc2013 215 $a1 online resource (xii, 283 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-02652-0 311 $a1-299-74945-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction -- Part I. The Logic of Constitutional Choice : Theory and Data : 1. Constitutional change and patterns of design ; 2. A two-level theory of constitutional choice ; 3. Determinants of variation in constitutional choice -- Part II. Case Studies : The Origins of Reforms : 4. Constitutional change as a means to consolidate power : Argentina 1949 ; 5. Constitutional change as a strategy to redistribute power : Argentina 1994 ; 6. Constitutional change as a response to state failure : Colombia 1991 ; 7. Constitutional change as a remedy for ungovernability : Ecuador 1998. 330 $aNegretto provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs from an analytical, historical and comparative perspective. Based on analysis of constitutional change in Latin America from 1900 to 2008 and four detailed case studies, Negretto shows the main determinants of constitutional choice are the past performance of constitutions in providing effective and legitimate instruments of government and the strategic interests of the actors who have influence over institutional selection. The book explains how governance problems shape the general guidelines for reform, while strategic calculations and power resources affect the selection of specific alternatives of design. It emphasizes the importance of events that trigger reform and the designers' level of electoral uncertainty for understanding the relative impact of short-term partisan interests on constitution writing. Negretto's study challenges predominant theories of institutional choice and paves the way for the development of a new research agenda on institutional change. 606 $aRepresentative government and representation$zLatin America$xHistory$y20th century 607 $aLatin America$xPolitics and government$y20th century 615 0$aRepresentative government and representation$xHistory 676 $a320.98 686 $aPOL000000$2bisacsh 700 $aNegretto$b Gabriel L$01692558 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910811132503321 996 $aMaking constitutions$94069742 997 $aUNINA