LEADER 04010nam 2200649Ia 450 001 9910810618203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-281-39714-8 010 $a9786611397142 010 $a0-88132-460-4 010 $a1-4356-5535-4 035 $a(CKB)1000000000535170 035 $a(OCoLC)290580194 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10231494 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000108543 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11129028 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000108543 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10044423 035 $a(PQKB)10001840 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3385473 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3385473 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10231494 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL139714 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000535170 100 $a20031203d2004 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBailouts or bail-ins? $eresponding to financial crises in emerging economies /$fNouriel Roubini and Brad Setser 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aWashington, DC $cInstitute for International Economics$d2004 215 $a1 online resource (442 p.) 300 $a"A Council on Foreign Relations book." 311 $a0-88132-371-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 391-405) and index. 327 $aCover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Why Crisis Resolution? -- Purging Unhelpful Myths -- Closing the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality -- Agenda for Reform -- Structure of the Book -- Chapter 2 New Nature of Emerging-Market Crises -- Sources of Vulnerability in Emerging-Market Crises -- Interpreting Recent Crises -- Conclusions -- Chapter 3 Analytical Literature on Crisis Resolution -- Four Approaches to Crisis Resolution -- Crisis Resolution in IMF's Absence -- IMF, Crises of Creditor Coordination, and Moral Hazard -- Do Partial Bailouts Ever Work? -- Policy Implications and Suggestions for Further Research -- Chapter 4 Experience with Bailouts and Bail-ins -- Experience with Official Financing -- Experience with Bail-in Policies: Rollover Arrangements and Debt Exchanges -- Lessons for the Official Sector -- Lessons from Bond Restructurings -- Lessons from Restructuring of Bank Claims -- Conclusions -- Chapter 5 Official Policy Toward Crisis Resolution -- Reaction to Mexico's Bailout -- Reform of the International Financial Architecture -- The Debate Fractures -- A New Administration, a New Policy? -- Conclusions -- Chapter 6 Responding to Liquidity Shortages -- When Is Official Liquidity Support Warranted? -- Are Targeted Debt Reschedulings Inequitable? -- Risks of Gradual Escalation -- Case for Pragmatism -- Private-Sector Financial Difficulties -- Alternative Approaches to Liquidity Crises -- What Is the Right Policy? -- Chapter 7 Seniority of Sovereign Debts -- Relative Treatment of Different Sovereign Claims -- Domestic Versus External Debt -- Arguments in Favor of a Formal Debt Seniority Regime -- Conclusion -- Chapter 8 Legal Reform -- Potential Obstacles to Sovereign Debt Restructuring -- Approaches to Legal Reform -- Codes and Committees -- Assessing Reform Proposals -- Conclusion. 327 $aChapter 9 Recommendations for Reform -- "Hardware" Largely in Place -- Problems with Crisis Resolution "Software" -- Moving from Problems to Solutions -- Conclusion -- Appendix A Tables -- References -- Glossary -- Index. 606 $aLoans, Foreign$zDeveloping countries 606 $aFinancial crises$zDeveloping countries 606 $aInternational finance 606 $aDebt$zDeveloping countries 615 0$aLoans, Foreign 615 0$aFinancial crises 615 0$aInternational finance. 615 0$aDebt 676 $a338.5/43 700 $aRoubini$b Nouriel$0126323 701 $aSetser$b Brad$01677912 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910810618203321 996 $aBailouts or bail-ins$94045186 997 $aUNINA