LEADER 03634nam 2200661 450 001 9910810559203321 005 20230217231545.0 010 $a0-8014-7021-8 010 $a0-8014-5683-5 010 $a0-8014-7022-6 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801470226 035 $a(CKB)2550000001192915 035 $a(OCoLC)869282548 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10831265 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001114827 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12490066 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001114827 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11073577 035 $a(PQKB)10432213 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138567 035 $a(DE-B1597)527391 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801470226 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse58355 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138567 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10831265 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL683545 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001192915 100 $a20140210h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe triumph of improvisation $eGorbachev's adaptability, Reagan's engagement, and the end of the Cold War /$fJames Graham Wilson 210 1$aNew York, New York :$cCornell University Press,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (281 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-322-52263-4 311 $a0-8014-5229-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntroduction : individuals and power -- Reagan reaches -- Stagnation and choices -- Shultz engages -- Gorbachev adapts -- Recovery and statecraft -- Gorbachev's new world order -- Bush's new world order -- Conclusion : individuals and strategy. 330 $aIn The Triumph of Improvisation, James Graham Wilson takes a long view of the end of the Cold War, from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. Drawing on deep archival research and recently declassified papers, Wilson argues that adaptation, improvisation, and engagement by individuals in positions of power ended the specter of a nuclear holocaust. Amid ambivalence and uncertainty, Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, George H. W. Bush, and a host of other actors engaged with adversaries and adapted to a rapidly changing international environment and information age in which global capitalism recovered as command economies failed.Eschewing the notion of a coherent grand strategy to end the Cold War, Wilson paints a vivid portrait of how leaders made choices; some made poor choices while others reacted prudently, imaginatively, and courageously to events they did not foresee. A book about the burdens of responsibility, the obstacles of domestic politics, and the human qualities of leadership, The Triumph of Improvisation concludes with a chapter describing how George H. W. Bush oversaw the construction of a new configuration of power after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one that resolved the fundamental components of the Cold War on Washington's terms. 606 $aCold War$xDiplomatic history 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zSoviet Union 607 $aSoviet Union$xForeign relations$zUnited States 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1981-1989 615 0$aCold War$xDiplomatic history. 676 $a327.73047 686 $aNQ 5910$2rvk 700 $aWilson$b James$f1980-$01684526 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910810559203321 996 $aThe triumph of improvisation$94056080 997 $aUNINA