LEADER 04164nam 2200625Ia 450 001 9910810049703321 005 20230208010507.0 010 $a0-8014-6710-1 010 $a1-322-50420-2 010 $a0-8014-6711-X 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801467110 035 $a(CKB)2550000001192951 035 $a(EBL)3138446 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001035789 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11628565 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001035789 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11030525 035 $a(PQKB)11760571 035 $a(DE-B1597)481702 035 $a(OCoLC)987933458 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801467110 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138446 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10672832 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL681702 035 $a(OCoLC)922998377 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138446 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001192951 100 $a19980309d1998 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFast tanks and heavy bombers $einnovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 /$fDavid E. Johnson 210 $aIthaca $cCornell University Press$d1998 215 $a1 online resource (304 p.) 225 0 $aCornell studies in security affairs 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 1 $a0-8014-8847-8 311 1 $a0-8014-3458-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 277-283) and index. 327 $tFrontmatter --$tContents --$tTables --$tAcknowledgments --$tIntroduction --$tPart I. Soldiers and Machines: 1917-1920 --$t1. America, the Army, and the Great War --$t2. The Tank Corps --$t3. The Air Service --$t4. The Army in the Aftermath of the Great War --$tPart II. Inertia and Insurgency: 1921-1930 --$t5. Peace and Quiet --$t6. Infantry Tanks --$t7. The Failed Revolution and the Evolution of Air Force --$t8. The War Department --$tPart III. Alternatives and Autonomy: 1931-1942 --$t9. From Domestic Depression to International Crusade --$t10. Alternatives for Armor --$t11. Autonomous Air Power --$t12. A Crisis in the War Department --$tPart IV. Dying for Change: 1942-1945 --$t13. The Arsenal of Attrition --$t14. Armored Bludgeon --$t15. Air Force Triumphant --$t16. Coequal Land Power and Air Power --$tConclusion --$tNotes --$tPrimary Sources --$tIndex 330 $aThe U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine. Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces. Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation. 410 0$aCornell Studies in Security Affairs 606 $aWeapons systems$zUnited States 615 0$aWeapons systems 676 $a355/.07/097309041 700 $aJohnson$b David E$g(David Eugene),$f1950-2022.$01324812 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910810049703321 996 $aFast tanks and heavy bombers$93967345 997 $aUNINA