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135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 14$aThe paradox of predictivism /$fEric Christian Barnes
205   $a1st ed.
210   $aCambridge ;$aNew York $cCambridge University Press$d2008
215   $a1 online resource (x, 265 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a1-107-40516-5 
311   $a0-521-87962-0 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 249-257) and index.
327   $aCover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; CHAPTER 1 The paradox of predictivism; CHAPTER 2 Epistemic pluralism; CHAPTER 3 Predictivism and the Periodic Table of the Elements; CHAPTER 4 Miracle arguments and the demise of strong predictivism; CHAPTER 5 The predicting community; CHAPTER 6 Back to epistemic pluralism; CHAPTER 7 Postlude on old evidence; CHAPTER 8 A paradox resolved; Glossary; Bibliography; Index
330   $aAn enduring question in the philosophy of science is the question of whether a scientific theory deserves more credit for its successful predictions than it does for accommodating data that was already known when the theory was developed. In The Paradox of Predictivism, Eric Barnes argues that the successful prediction of evidence testifies to the general credibility of the predictor in a way that evidence does not when the evidence is used in the process of endorsing the theory. He illustrates his argument with an important episode from nineteenth-century chemistry, Mendeleev's Periodic Law and its successful predictions of the existence of various elements. The consequences of this account of predictivism for the realist/anti-realist debate are considerable, and strengthen the status of the 'no miracle' argument for scientific realism. Barnes's important and original contribution to the debate will interest a wide range of readers in philosophy of science.
606   $aScience$xPhilosophy
606   $aScience$xForecasting
615  0$aScience$xPhilosophy.
615  0$aScience$xForecasting.
676   $a501
700   $aBarnes$b Eric C$g(Eric Christian),$f1959-$01704081
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906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910809549703321
996   $aThe paradox of predictivism$94089802
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