LEADER 08217nam 2200577 a 450 001 9910809512303321 005 20240410133013.0 010 $a0-313-00451-X 035 $a(CKB)111056486267798 035 $a(OCoLC)50026134 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary5004853 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000210292 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11189864 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000210292 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10282425 035 $a(PQKB)10238506 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL283706 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr5004853 035 $a(OCoLC)437175979 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC283706 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111056486267798 100 $a20000224d2000 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 04$aThe new financial architecture $ebanking regulation in the 21st century /$fedited by Benton E. Gup 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aWestport, Conn. $cQuorum Books$d2000 215 $a1 online resource (269 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-56720-341-8 311 $a0-585-38380-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover -- The New Financial Architecture -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Preface -- ADDITIONAL RESOURCES -- 1 Regulating International Banking:Rationale, History, and FutureProspects -- INTRODUCTION -- WHY DO WE REGULATE MULTINATIONAL BANKS? -- HISTORY OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION -- The Bank for International Settlements and the Basle Committee -- The 1999 Basle Proposal -- Other International Agreements -- THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION -- REFERENCES -- 2 Are Banks and TheirRegulators Outdated? -- INTRODUCTION -- WHAT IS A BANK? -- A PATCHWORK SYSTEM OF REGULATION -- THE FUNCTIONS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM -- FUNCTIONAL REGULATION -- The Central Bank as the Regulator -- Global Regulator -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 3 Designing the New Architecturefor U.S. Banking -- DISSATISFACTION WITH THE OLD ARCHITECTURE -- LEGISLATING THE NEW ARCHITECTURE -- DANGERS OF THE "WRONG" ARCHITECTURE -- FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE AND ASSET PRICE BUBBLES -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 4 What Is Optimal FinancialRegulation? -- INTRODUCTION -- RATIONALES FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION -- Guarding Against Systemic Risk -- Protecting Consumers -- Enhancing Efficiency -- Achieving Other Social Objectives -- WHY BANKS HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT -- PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: THE FINANCIAL SAFETY NET -- OPTIMAL REGULATION IN THE STATIC CASE: PRICING RISK TO COUNTER MORAL HAZARD -- Risk-Rated Deposit Insurance Premiums -- Prompt Corrective Action and Least-Cost Resolution -- Subordinated Debt -- Narrow Bank Proposals -- LOOKING BEYOND THE STATIC VIEW: BANKS HAVE BECOME LESS SPECIAL -- "OPTIMAL" REGULATION IN THE TRANSITION: SOME SIMPLE PRESCRIPTIONS -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 5 The Optimum Regulatory Model forthe Next Millennium-Lessons fromInternational Comparisons and theAustralian-Asian Experience -- INTRODUCTION. 327 $aA TAXONOMY OF REGULATORY MODELS FOR FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN DIFFERENT LIFE CYCLE PHASES -- Prudential Supervisory Systems -- Protective Measures -- A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY MODELS GOVERNING THE AUSTRALIAN AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS -- Singapore -- Thailand -- Hong Kong -- Japan -- Taiwan -- Malaysia -- Indonesia -- Korea -- The Philippines -- IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATORY FAILURE IN THE AUSTRALASIAN REGION FOR THE OPTIMUM REGULATORY MODEL FOR THE NEXT MILLENNIUM -- The Usefulness of a Taxonomy of Regulatory Models Governing Financial Systems -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 6 Banking Trends and DepositInsurance Risk Assessment in theTwenty-First Century -- INTRODUCTION -- DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKING -- Consolidation -- Bank Activities -- Globalization -- Technological Change -- IMPLICATIONS FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE -- BANK SUPERVISION AND REGULATION -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 7 Supervisory Goals andSubordinated Debt -- SUPERVISORY GOALS -- HOW SND MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GOALS -- THE ROLE OF SND IN EXISTING CAPITAL REGULATIONS -- SND PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE PUBLIC POLICY GOALS -- Minimize Safety Net Losses -- Loss Absorption -- Prompt Closure -- Minimizing the Probability of Failure -- Direct Discipline -- Derived Supervisory Discipline -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 8 Market Discipline for Banks: AHistorical Review -- INTRODUCTION -- Historical Experiences -- INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF FREE BANKING -- The "Invisible Hand" in Free-Banking Theory -- THE FREE-BANKING EXPERIENCE IN SCOTLAND -- Scottish Banking: 1695-1845 -- A Successful Experience with Market Discipline? -- A Centralized System -- Stability and Optimality in Operations -- Scottish Free Banking Was Not Laissez-Faire Banking -- THE FREE-BANKING EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES -- Was American Free Banking Laissez-Faire Banking?. 327 $a"Wildcat Banking" or Successful "Market Discipline"? -- The Suffolk Banking System -- UNREGULATED TRUSTS IN NEW YORK -- CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- 9 Market Discipline and theCorporate Governance of Banks:Theory vs. Evidence -- PRIVATE MARKET REGULATION -- PRINCIPAL AGENT CONFLICTS -- Control Mechanisms -- ARE MARKET CONTROL MECHANISMS EFFECTIVE? -- Corporate Behavior -- Distressed Banks -- Other Banking Studies -- Subordinated Debt -- REQUIREMENTS FOR MARKET DISCIPLINE -- Action -- Active Money and Capital Markets and Rating Agencies -- Awareness of Vulnerabilities -- Corporate Accounting Standards -- Transparency -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 10 Message to Basle: Risk ReductionRather Than Management -- INTRODUCTION -- CREDIT RISK MODELS AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS -- Credit Risk Models -- General Loan Valuations Features -- Loan Repricing -- Loan Valuation Models -- Default Mode -- Mark-to-Model Approach -- Credit Spreads -- Discounted Contractual Cash Flow (DCCF) Approach -- Limits of Bond Market Analogue -- Credit Risk Ratings -- Assessment of Ratings Agencies -- Ratings Predictions -- Credit Risk Is a Decision Variable-Market Risk Is a Given Parameter -- REFORM PROPOSALS -- Improvements in Quality of Credit Risk Analysis -- Loan Officers as Investment Analysts -- Combining Commercial and Investment Banking -- Improvements in Risk Ratings -- Rating over the Longer Horizon -- Stress Testing by Ratings Agencies and Banks -- Linking Asset Risk to Country Rating -- Including Market Risk in Analysis -- Market Risk, Time Horizon, and Risk Migration -- Asymmetric Information Obscures the Issue -- Risk Correlations -- Loan Valuations -- Improvements in Supervisory-Lending Officer Linkage -- Training Supervisors -- Lack of Courage of Conviction -- Allow Failure of Large Financial Institutions and Disorderly Markets to Occur. 327 $aCONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- 11 Drafting Land Legislation forDeveloping Countries: An Examplefrom East Africa -- INTRODUCTION -- THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF AN IDEA -- THE DRAFTING PROCESS -- Location, Staffing, and Power of the Tribunal -- Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Tribunal -- Representation and the Expedited Process of Hearing a Dispute -- The Operating Procedure of the Tribunal -- Miscellaneous -- CONCLUSION -- APPENDIX A Table of Contents of the Sections of the Zanzibar LandTribunal Act19 -- APPENDIX B Table of Contents of the Sections of the Zanzibar LandTribunal Act Regulations -- APPENDIX C Table of Contents: List of Forms to Accompany the LandTribunal Act -- NOTES -- Index -- About the Editor and Contributors. 330 $aA resource for banking, finance, investment and world trade professionals and their academic counterparts. It covers a wide range of topics, from the rationale of banking regulation, to optimal banking regulation in the new world environments. 606 $aBanks and banking, International$xLaw and legislation 615 0$aBanks and banking, International$xLaw and legislation. 676 $a346/.08215 701 $aGup$b Benton E$0107604 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910809512303321 996 $aThe new financial architecture$94098759 997 $aUNINA