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200 14$aThe correspondence theory of truth $ean essay on the metaphysics of predication /$fAndrew Newman$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2002.
215   $a1 online resource (xii, 251 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
225 1 $aCambridge studies in philosophy
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-00988-X 
311   $a0-521-81139-2 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 236-243) and index.
327   $g1.$tUniversals, Predication, and Truth.$g1.1.$tThe Problem of Universals.$g1.2.$tTheories of Universals.$g1.3.$tPredication, Participation, and Inherence.$g1.4.$tUniversals, Truth, and Devitt --$g2.$tThe Univocity of Truth.$g2.1.$tHorwich and Deflationary Theories of Truth.$g2.2.$tAlston and Minimalist Realism about Truth.$g2.3.$tThe Problem of the Univocity of Truth.$g2.4.$tReality and the Eleatic Principle --$g3.$tThe Correspondence Theory for Predicative Sentences.$g3.1.$tDifficulties about States of Affairs in the Tractatus.$g3.2.$tTruth as Isomorphism between Sentence and State of Affairs.$g3.3.$tThe Nominalist Account of Atomic Facts.$g3.4.$tThe Realist Account of Atomic Facts.$g3.5.$tCorrespondence for Sentences with and without Facts.
330   $aThis work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It includes discussion of contemporary philosophers such as David Armstrong, William Alston and Paul Horwich, as well as those who write about propositions and facts, and a number of students of Bertrand Russell. It will interest teachers and advanced students of philosophy who are interested in the realistic conception of truth and in issues in metaphysics related to the correspondence theory of truth, and those interested in Russell and the Tractatus.
410  0$aCambridge studies in philosophy.
606   $aTruth$xCorrespondence theory
606   $aLanguage and languages$xPhilosophy
615  0$aTruth$xCorrespondence theory.
615  0$aLanguage and languages$xPhilosophy.
676   $a121
700   $aNewman$b Andrew$f1948-$01120848
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801  1$bUkCbUP
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910809387403321
996   $aThe correspondence theory of truth$93963230
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