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101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
200 14$aThe politics of authoritarian rule
210  1$aCambridge$cCambridge University Press$d2012
215   $a1 online resource (xviii, 228 pages)
225 1 $aCambridge studies in comparative politics
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311 0 $a1-107-60745-0 
311 0 $a1-107-02479-X 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aMachine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship; 2. The world of authoritarian politics; Part I. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing: 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship; 4. Institutions, collective action, and the success of authoritarian power-sharing; Part II. The Problem of Authoritarian Control: 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships; 6. Why authoritarian parties?: The regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control; 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics.
330   $aWhat drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.
410  0$aCambridge studies in comparative politics.
606   $aAuthoritarianism$2FBC
606   $aAuthoritarianism$vCase studies$2FBC
606   $aAutoritær styreform$2FBC
606   $aDiktatur$2FBC
606   $aHistorie$2FBC
608   $aElectronic Books
615  0$aAuthoritarianism.
615  0$aAuthoritarianism
615  7$aAutoritær styreform
615  7$aDiktatur
615  7$aHistorie
686   $a321
701   $aSvolik$b Milan W$01674549
801  0$bUkCbUP
801  1$bUkCbUP
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910809364403321
996   $aThe politics of authoritarian rule$94039474
997   $aUNINA