LEADER 04638nam 2200757 a 450 001 9910809363703321 005 20211001033208.0 010 $a1-283-53989-6 010 $a9786613852342 010 $a1-4008-2073-1 010 $a1-4008-1164-3 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400820733 035 $a(CKB)111056486507898 035 $a(EBL)919503 035 $a(OCoLC)794663579 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000223689 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11221277 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000223689 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10205769 035 $a(PQKB)11434522 035 $a(OCoLC)51328409 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36241 035 $a(DE-B1597)447246 035 $a(OCoLC)979685144 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400820733 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL919503 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10035808 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL385234 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC919503 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111056486507898 100 $a19920116d1992 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn#---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aPolitical questions/judicial answers$b[electronic resource] $edoes the rule of law apply to foreign affairs? /$fThomas M. Franck 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc1992 215 $a1 online resource (209 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-691-09241-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$tCHAPTER ONE. Introduction --$tCHAPTER TWO. How Abdication Crept into the Judicial Repertory --$tCHAPTER THREE. Two Principled Theories of Constitutionalism --$tCHAPTER FOUR. Prudential Reasons for Judicial Abdication --$tCHAPTER FIVE. When Judges Refuse to Abdicate --$tCHAPTER SIX. Mandated Adjudication: Act of State and Sovereign Immunity --$tCHAPTER SEVEN. Abolishing Judicial Abdication: The German Model --$tCHAPTER EIGHT. A Rule of Evidence in Place of the Political-Question Doctrine --$tCHAPTER NINE. The Special Cases: In Camera Proceedings and Declaratory Judgments --$tCHAPTER TEN. Conclusions: Does the Rule of Law Stop at the Water's Edge? --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aAlmost since the beginning of the republic, America's rigorous separation of powers among Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches has been umpired by the federal judiciary. It may seem surprising, then, that many otherwise ordinary cases are not decided in court even when they include allegations that the President, or Congress, has violated a law or the Constitution itself. Most of these orphan cases are shunned by the judiciary simply because they have foreign policy aspects. In refusing to address the issues involved, judges indicate that judicial review, like politics, should stop at the water's edge--and foreign policy managers find it convenient to agree! Thomas Franck, however, maintains that when courts invoke the "political question" doctrine to justify such reticence, they evade a constitutional duty. In his view, whether the government has acted constitutionally in sending men and women to die in foreign battles is just as appropriate an issue for a court to decide as whether property has been taken without due process. In this revisionist work, Franck proposes ways to subject the conduct of foreign policy to the rule of law without compromising either judicial integrity or the national interest. By examining the historical origins of the separation of powers in the American constitutional tradition, with comparative reference to the practices of judiciaries in other federal systems, he broadens and enriches discussions of an important national issue that has particular significance for critical debate about the "imperial presidency." 606 $aPolitical questions and judicial power$zUnited States 606 $aJudicial review$zUnited States 606 $aCourts$zUnited States 606 $aSeparation of powers$zUnited States 606 $aNational security$xLaw and legislation$zUnited States 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations 615 0$aPolitical questions and judicial power 615 0$aJudicial review 615 0$aCourts 615 0$aSeparation of powers 615 0$aNational security$xLaw and legislation 676 $a342.73/044 676 $a347.30244 700 $aFranck$b Thomas M$0148302 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910809363703321 996 $aPolitical questions$94039467 997 $aUNINA