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010   $a1-283-56128-X
010   $a9786613873736
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035   $a(OCoLC)535146898
035   $a(IMF)WPIEE2352004
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100   $a20090807d2004      uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aManaging confidence in emerging market bank runs /$fprepared by Se-Jik Kim and Ashoka Mody
205   $a1st ed.
210   $a[Washington, D.C.] $cInternational Monetary Fund, European Dept., and Research Dept.$d2004
215   $a1 online resource (29 p.)
225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$vWP/04/235
300   $a"December 2004."
311   $a1-4518-7568-1 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 27-28).
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""III. SIMULTANEOUS VERSUS SEQUENTIAL LIQUIDITY SHORTAGES""; ""IV. EARLY VERSUS LATE BAILOUTS""; ""V. POLITICAL ECONOMY""; ""VI. EXTENSIONS""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""
330 3 $aIn a rational-expectations framework, we model depositors' confidence as a function of the probability of future bank bailouts. We analyze the effect of alternative bank bailout policies on depositors' confidence in an emerging market setting, where liquidity shortages of banks are revealed sequentially and governments cannot credibly commit to bailing out all potentially distressed banks. Our findings suggest that allowing early bank failures and using available liquidity for credible commitments to later bailouts can better boost confidence than early bailouts. This conclusion arises because with a high chance of liquidity shortage in the future, depositors may lose confidence and hence withdraw deposits even from potentially sound banks. Such a policy of late bailouts is likely to receive political support when a full bailout needs to be financed by taxation. The logic of late bailout remains valid even when banks may hide their distress or when closures of early distressed banks create contagion.
410  0$aIMF working paper ;$vWP/04/235.
606   $aBank failures$zDeveloping countries$xEconometric models
606   $aLiquidity (Economics)$zDeveloping countries$xEconometric models
615  0$aBank failures$xEconometric models.
615  0$aLiquidity (Economics)$xEconometric models.
700   $aKim$b Se-Jik$f1960-$01623190
701   $aMody$b Ashoka$0888386
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bEuropean Dept.
712 02$aInternational Monetary Fund.$bResearch Dept.
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910808872803321
996   $aManaging Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs$93986698
997   $aUNINA