LEADER 04514nam 2200697 450 001 9910808836003321 005 20210512233031.0 010 $a0-8014-7192-3 010 $a0-8014-7193-1 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801471933 035 $a(CKB)3710000000311090 035 $a(OCoLC)897815016 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10993837 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001382346 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12594236 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001382346 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11459464 035 $a(PQKB)11220075 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001510479 035 $a(OCoLC)966925028 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse51814 035 $a(DE-B1597)478700 035 $a(OCoLC)979576559 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801471933 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138681 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10993837 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL683586 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138681 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000311090 100 $a20141220h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBarriers to bioweapons $ethe challenges of expertise and organization for weapons development /$fSonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley 210 1$aIthaca, New York :$cCornell University Press,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (237 p.) 225 1 $aCornell Studies in Security Affairs 300 $aIncludes index. 311 $a1-322-52304-5 311 $a0-8014-5288-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tPreface and Acknowledgments --$t1. The Bioproliferation Puzzle --$t2. The Acquisition and Use of Specialized Knowledge --$t3. Impediments and Facilitators of Bioweapons Development --$t4. The American Bioweapons Program: Struggling with a Split Personality Disorder --$t5. The Soviet Bioweapons Program: Failed Integration --$t6. Small Bioweapons Programs and the Constraints of Covertness --$t7. Preventing Bioweapons Developments: Policy Implications --$tAppendix 1: American Bioweapons Program: Contractors --$tAppendix 2: American Bioweapons Program: Approximate Bud get Figures --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aIn both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs. Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production. 410 0$aCornell studies in security affairs. 606 $aBiological arms control$xFormer Soviet republics 606 $aBiological arms control$zUnited States 615 0$aBiological arms control$xFormer Soviet republics. 615 0$aBiological arms control 676 $a358/.388 686 $aMZ 6800$2rvk 700 $aBen Ouagrham-Gormley$b Sonia$01681780 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910808836003321 996 $aBarriers to bioweapons$94051415 997 $aUNINA