LEADER 05008oam 22012014 450 001 9910808810403321 005 20240410162434.0 010 $a1-4623-2155-0 010 $a1-4527-5821-2 010 $a1-282-44728-9 010 $a1-4519-8717-X 010 $a9786613820938 035 $a(CKB)3360000000443132 035 $a(EBL)3014373 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001478558 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11810660 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001478558 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11469901 035 $a(PQKB)10438195 035 $a(OCoLC)712989257 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014373 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2006176 035 $a(EXLCZ)993360000000443132 100 $a20020129d2006 uf 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLending Resumption After Default : $eLessons from Capital Markets During the 19th Century /$fJuan Sole 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006. 215 $a1 online resource (28 p.) 225 1 $aIMF Working Papers 300 $a"July 2006". 311 $a1-4518-6436-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $a""Contents""; ""I. MOTIVATION""; ""II. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE ON DEFAULT AND LENDING RESUMPTION""; ""III. THE ENVIRONMENT""; ""IV. OBSERVABLE TYPES""; ""V. UNOBSERVABLE TYPES""; ""VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 3 AND 4 ""; ""REFERENCES"" 330 3 $aThis paper mines the experience of capital markets during the 19th century to propose an alternative way of interpreting international default episodes. The standard view is that defaulting on sovereign debt entails exclusion from capital markets. Yet we have observed multiple instances of sovereign debt default in which the reaction of lenders was not the one predicted by the punishment story: in some cases, lending ceased for long periods, but in others it was not interrupted. This paper claims that the reaction of lenders after default stems from the additional knowledge about the borrower that lenders acquire during these episodes. The lending relationship is modeled in a costly state-verification environment in which governments have private information about their investment projects (good or bad). It is shown that, in the event of default, it is worthwhile for lenders to find out more about the type of project, and then interrupt lending only if the project is believed to be a bad one. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/176 606 $aDebts, Public 606 $aDefault (Finance) 606 $aFinance: General$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics$2imf 606 $aMoney and Monetary Policy$2imf 606 $aIndustries: Financial Services$2imf 606 $aEnvironmental Economics$2imf 606 $aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General$2imf 606 $aBanks$2imf 606 $aDepository Institutions$2imf 606 $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf 606 $aMortgages$2imf 606 $aMacroeconomics: Consumption$2imf 606 $aSaving$2imf 606 $aWealth$2imf 606 $aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)$2imf 606 $aEnvironmental Economics: General$2imf 606 $aFinance$2imf 606 $aMonetary economics$2imf 606 $aEnvironmental economics$2imf 606 $aCredit$2imf 606 $aLoans$2imf 606 $aConsumption$2imf 606 $aInternational capital markets$2imf 606 $aEnvironment$2imf 606 $aEconomics$2imf 606 $aCapital market$2imf 606 $aEnvironmental sciences$2imf 607 $aBulgaria$2imf 615 0$aDebts, Public. 615 0$aDefault (Finance) 615 7$aFinance: General 615 7$aMacroeconomics 615 7$aMoney and Monetary Policy 615 7$aIndustries: Financial Services 615 7$aEnvironmental Economics 615 7$aMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General 615 7$aBanks 615 7$aDepository Institutions 615 7$aMicro Finance Institutions 615 7$aMortgages 615 7$aMacroeconomics: Consumption 615 7$aSaving 615 7$aWealth 615 7$aGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) 615 7$aEnvironmental Economics: General 615 7$aFinance 615 7$aMonetary economics 615 7$aEnvironmental economics 615 7$aCredit 615 7$aLoans 615 7$aConsumption 615 7$aInternational capital markets 615 7$aEnvironment 615 7$aEconomics 615 7$aCapital market 615 7$aEnvironmental sciences 700 $aSole$b Juan$01159164 801 0$bDcWaIMF 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910808810403321 996 $aLending Resumption After Default$94006591 997 $aUNINA