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010   $a1-282-64909-4
010   $a9786613822901
010   $a1-4519-0969-1
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035   $a(EBL)3014343
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035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941195
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035   $a(IMF)WPIEE2006256
035   $a(IMF)WPIEA2006256
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100   $a20020129d2006      uf         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aGoal-Independent Central Banks : $eWhy Politicians Decide to Delegate /$fChristopher Crowe
205   $a1st ed.
210  1$aWashington, D.C. :$cInternational Monetary Fund,$d2006.
215   $a1 online resource (43 p.)
225 1 $aIMF Working Papers
300   $a"November 2006."
311   $a1-4518-6516-3 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references.
327   $a""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Predictions""; ""IV. Empirical Tests""; ""V. Case Studies""; ""VI. Conclusions""
330 3 $aA motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this.
410  0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2006/256
606   $aBanks and banking, Central
606   $aMonetary policy
606   $aBanking$2imf
606   $aBanks and Banking$2imf
606   $aBanks and banking$2imf
606   $aBanks$2imf
606   $aCentral bank autonomy$2imf
606   $aCentral Banks and Their Policies$2imf
606   $aCentral banks$2imf
606   $aDeflation$2imf
606   $aDepository Institutions$2imf
606   $aIncome$2imf
606   $aInflation$2imf
606   $aMacroeconomics$2imf
606   $aMicro Finance Institutions$2imf
606   $aModels of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior$2imf
606   $aMortgages$2imf
606   $aMultiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models$2imf
606   $aNational accounts$2imf
606   $aNoncooperative Games$2imf
606   $aPersonal income$2imf
606   $aPersonal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions$2imf
606   $aPrice Level$2imf
606   $aPrices$2imf
606   $aSpatial Models$2imf
606   $aTreatment Effect Models$2imf
607   $aSouth Africa$2imf
615  0$aBanks and banking, Central.
615  0$aMonetary policy.
615  7$aBanking
615  7$aBanks and Banking
615  7$aBanks and banking
615  7$aBanks
615  7$aCentral bank autonomy
615  7$aCentral Banks and Their Policies
615  7$aCentral banks
615  7$aDeflation
615  7$aDepository Institutions
615  7$aIncome
615  7$aInflation
615  7$aMacroeconomics
615  7$aMicro Finance Institutions
615  7$aModels of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
615  7$aMortgages
615  7$aMultiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional Models
615  7$aNational accounts
615  7$aNoncooperative Games
615  7$aPersonal income
615  7$aPersonal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
615  7$aPrice Level
615  7$aPrices
615  7$aSpatial Models
615  7$aTreatment Effect Models
700   $aCrowe$b Christopher$0868737
801  0$bDcWaIMF
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910808808403321
996   $aGoal-Independent Central Banks$93957462
997   $aUNINA