LEADER 04501nam 2200601Ia 450 001 9910808594703321 005 20240416152655.0 010 $a0-674-03655-7 024 7 $a10.4159/9780674036550 035 $a(CKB)2520000000006973 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH21620409 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000429318 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11965347 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000429318 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10430190 035 $a(PQKB)10367390 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3300772 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3300772 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10362249 035 $a(OCoLC)923115972 035 $a(DE-B1597)571832 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674036550 035 $a(EXLCZ)992520000000006973 100 $a19860218d1985 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aTakings $eprivate property and the power of eminent domain /$fRichard A. Epstein 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aCambridge, MA $cHarvard University Press$d1985 215 $a1 online resource (376 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-674-86728-9 311 $a0-674-86729-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes. 327 $aPhilosophical Preliminaries A Tale of Two Pies Hobbesian Man, Lockean World The Integrity of Constitutional Text Takings Prima Facie Takings and Torts Partial Takings: The Unity of Ownership Possession and Use Rights of Disposition and Contract Taking from Many: Liability Rules, Regulations, and Taxes Justifications for Takings The Police Power: Ends The Police Power: Means Consent and Assumption of Risk Public Use and Just Compensation Public Use Explicit Compensation Implicit In-Kind Compensation Property and the Common Pool Regulation Taxation Transfer Payments and Welfare Rights Conclusion: Philosophical Implications Index of Cases General Index 330 8 $aIf legal scholar Richard Epstein is right, then the New Deal is wrong, if not unconstitutional. Epstein develops a coherent normative theory that permits us to distinguish between permissible takings for public use and impermissible ones. He then examines a wide range of government regulations and taxes under a single comprehensive theory.$bIf legal scholar Richard Epstein is right, then the New Deal is wrong, if not unconstitutional. Epstein reaches this sweeping conclusion after making a detailed analysis of the eminent domain, or takings, clause of the Constitution, which states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. In contrast to the other guarantees in the Bill of Rights, the eminent domain clause has been interpreted narrowly. It has been invoked to force the government to compensate a citizen when his land is taken to build a post office, but not when its value is diminished by a comprehensive zoning ordinance. Epstein argues that this narrow interpretation is inconsistent with the language of the takings clause and the political theory that animates it. He develops a coherent normative theory that permits us to distinguish between permissible takings for public use and impermissible ones. He then examines a wide range of government regulations and taxes under a single comprehensive theory. He asks four questions: What constitutes a taking of private property? When is that taking justified without compensation under the police power? When is a taking for public use? And when is a taking compensated, in cash or in kind? Zoning, rent control, progressive and special taxes, workers' compensation, and bankruptcy are only a few of the programs analyzed within this framework. Epstein's theory casts doubt upon the established view today that the redistribution of wealth is a proper function of government. Throughout the book he uses recent developments in law and economics and the theory of collective choice to find in the eminent domain clause a theory of political obligation that he claims is superior to any of its modern rivals. 606 $aEminent domain$zUnited States 606 $aRight of property$zUnited States 615 0$aEminent domain 615 0$aRight of property 676 $a343.73/0252 676 $a347.303252 700 $aEpstein$b Richard Allen$f1943-$0768194 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910808594703321 996 $aTakings$94063085 997 $aUNINA