LEADER 04365oam  2200805 a 450 
001 9910808349103321
005 20200520144314.0
010   $a979-82-16-02642-6
010   $a1-280-92642-2
010   $a9786610926428
010   $a0-313-01742-5
024 7 $a10.5040/9798216026426
035   $a(CKB)1000000000444146
035   $a(EBL)497108
035   $a(OCoLC)57447166
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000260048
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)11218495
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000260048
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10191546
035   $a(PQKB)11233725
035   $a(Au-PeEL)EBL497108
035   $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10347084
035   $a(CaONFJC)MIL92642
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC497108
035   $a(DLC)BP9798216026426BC
035   $a(EXLCZ)991000000000444146
100   $a20240214e20032024  uy         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 00$aToo big to fail $epolicies and practices in government bailouts /$fedited by Benton E. Gup
205   $a1st ed.
210  1$aWestport, Conn. :$cPraeger,$d2004.
210  2$aLondon :$cBloomsbury Publishing (UK),$d2024
215   $a1 online resource (368 p.)
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a1-56720-621-2 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aContents; Preface; PART I: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES; Chapter 1 Some Historical Perspectives on "Too Big to Fail" Policies; Chapter 2 What Does Too Big to Fail Mean?; Chapter 3 Too Big to Fail, Government Bailouts, and Managerial Incentives: The Case of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the Railroad Industry during the Great Depression; Chapter 4 Does Financial Liberalization Increase the Likelihood of a Systemic Banking Crisis? Evidence from the Past Three Decades and the Great Depression
327   $aChapter 5 The Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Farm Credit System: Historic Parallels and Implications for Systemic RiskChapter 6 Too Big to Fail in the Banking Industry: A Survey; Chapter 7 Too Big to Fail in U.S. Banking: Quo Vadis?; Chapter 8 The Fall and Rise of Banking Safety Net Subsidies; PART II: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES; Chapter 9 Too Big to Fail: The Australian Perspective; Chapter 10 Too Big to Fail: A Taxonomic Analysis; Chapter 11 Avoiding a Permanent Banking Crisis: The Hungarian Banking Sector in the 1990s; Chapter 12 Banking in Japan: Will Too Big to Fail Prevail?
327   $aPART III: TOO BIG, OR NOT TOO BIG TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND ENRONChapter 13 Are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Too Big to Fail?; Chapter 14 Enron: Not Too Big to Fail; About the Editors and Contributors; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; L; M; N; O; P; R; S; T; U; W
330   $aUsually associated with large bank failures, the phrase too big to fail, which is a particular form of government bailout, actually applies to a wide range of industries, as this volume makes clear. Examples range from Chrysler to Lockheed Aircraft and from New York City to Penn Central Railroad. Generally speaking, when a corporation, an organization, or an industry sector is considered by the government to be too important to the overall health of the economy, it will not be allowed to fail. Government bailouts are not new, nor are they limited to the United States. This book presents the vi
606   $aBank failures
606   $aBank failures$zUnited States
606   $aBankruptcy
606   $aBusiness failures
606   $aBusiness failures$zUnited States
606   $aCorporate reorganizations
606   $aCorporate turnarounds
606   $aIntervention (Federal government)
615  0$aBank failures.
615  0$aBank failures
615  0$aBankruptcy.
615  0$aBusiness failures.
615  0$aBusiness failures
615  0$aCorporate reorganizations.
615  0$aCorporate turnarounds.
615  0$aIntervention (Federal government)
676   $a338.7/4
701   $aGup$b Benton E$0107604
712 02$aFinancial Management Association International.$bMeeting$f(2002 :$eSan Antonio, Tex.)
801  0$bDLC
801  1$bDLC
801  2$bDLC
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910808349103321
996   $aToo big to fail$94053678
997   $aUNINA