LEADER 04559nam 22006974a 450 001 9910808214403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-107-12093-4 010 $a1-280-15479-9 010 $a0-511-11880-5 010 $a0-511-04103-9 010 $a0-511-15323-6 010 $a0-511-32512-6 010 $a0-511-49257-X 010 $a0-511-04643-X 035 $a(CKB)1000000000004979 035 $a(EBL)202356 035 $a(OCoLC)70721959 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000198011 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11186794 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000198011 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10169292 035 $a(PQKB)11051921 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511492570 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL202356 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10065748 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL15479 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC202356 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000004979 100 $a20000306d2000 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 00$aMarket structure and competition policy $egame theoretic approaches /$fedited by George Norman and Jacques-Francois Thisse 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aOxford, UK ;$aNew York $cCambridge University Press$d2000 215 $a1 online resource (xii, 293 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aA collection of 12 papers by European and North American scholars which develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. 311 $a1-107-40326-X 311 $a0-521-78333-X 327 $aCompetition policy and game-theory : reflections based on the cement industry case / Claude d'Aspremont, David Encaoua and Jean-Pierre Ponssard -- Legal standards and economic analysis of collusion in EC competition policy / Damien J. Neven -- A guided tour of the Folk Theorem / James W. Friedman -- Predatory pricing and anti-dumping / P.K. Mathew Tharakan -- Should pricing policies be regulated when firms may tacitly collude? / George Norman and Jacques-Franc?ois Thisse -- Tougher price competition or lower concentration : a trade-off for anti-trust authorities? / Claude d'Aspremont and Massimo Motta -- The strategic effects of supply guarantees : the raincheck game / Jonathan H. Hamilton -- Product market competition policy and technological performance / Stephen Martin -- On some issues in the theory of competition in regulated markets / Gianni De Fraja -- Modelling the entry and exit process in dynamic competition : an introduction to repeated-commitment models / Jean-Pierre Ponssard -- Coordination failures in the Cournot approach to deregulated bank competition / Andre? de Palma and Robert J. Gary-Bobo -- How the adoption of a new technology is affected by the interaction between labour and product markets / Xavier Wauthy and Yves Zenou. 330 $aThis 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers. 606 $aCompetition$xGovernment policy$xMathematical models 606 $aIndustrial policy$xMathematical models 606 $aGame theory 615 0$aCompetition$xGovernment policy$xMathematical models. 615 0$aIndustrial policy$xMathematical models. 615 0$aGame theory. 676 $a338.6/048 701 $aNorman$b George$f1946-$0121917 701 $aThisse$b Jacques Francois$0382554 701 $aPhlips$b Louis$058186 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910808214403321 996 $aMarket structure and competition policy$94194183 997 $aUNINA