LEADER 03742nam 2200697 450 001 9910807917903321 005 20230803195208.0 010 $a0-8047-9046-9 024 7 $a10.1515/9780804790468 035 $a(CKB)2670000000518479 035 $a(EBL)1604462 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001112423 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12414597 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001112423 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11159112 035 $a(PQKB)11107225 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1604462 035 $a(DE-B1597)564072 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780804790468 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1604462 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10834376 035 $a(OCoLC)869641912 035 $a(OCoLC)1178769743 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000518479 100 $a20140212h20142014 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n#|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aIt takes more than a network $ethe Iraqi insurgency and organizational adaptation /$fChad C. Serena 210 1$aStanford, California :$cStanford University Press,$d2014. 210 4$dİ2014 215 $a1 online resource (226 pages) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-8047-9045-0 311 0 $a0-8047-8903-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$tAcronyms and Abbreviations --$tIntroduction --$t1. The Nature of the Iraqi Insurgency, Networks, and Organizational Adaptation --$t2. The Iraqi Insurgency? Organizational Inputs --$t3. The Iraqi Insurgency?Organizational Outputs, Learning, and Summary of the Adaptive Cycle --$t4. Seeing Afghanistan, Thinking Iraq? Evaluating and Comparing the Insurgency in Afghanistan --$t5. It Takes More than a Network --$tNotes --$tReferences --$tIndex 330 $aIt Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptation. In particular, it answers the question of why the Iraqi insurgency was seemingly so successful between 2003 and late 2006 and yet nearly totally collapsed by 2008. The book's main argument is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals because many of its organizational strengths were also its organizational weaknesses: these characteristics abetted and then corrupted the Iraqi insurgency's ability to adapt. The book further compares the organizational adaptation of the Iraqi insurgency with the organizational adaptation of the Afghan insurgency. This is done to refine the findings of the Iraq case and to present a more robust analysis of the adaptive cycles of two large and diverse covert networked insurgencies. The book finds that the Afghan insurgency, although still ongoing, has adapted more successfully than the Iraqi insurgency because it has been better able to leverage the strengths and counter the weaknesses of its chosen organizational form. 606 $aInsurgency$zIraq 606 $aIraq War, 2003-2011 606 $aOrganizational change$zIraq 606 $aOrganizational effectiveness$zIraq 606 $aInsurgency$zAfghanistan 606 $aAfghan War, 2001-2021 615 0$aInsurgency 615 0$aIraq War, 2003-2011. 615 0$aOrganizational change 615 0$aOrganizational effectiveness 615 0$aInsurgency 615 0$aAfghan War, 2001-2021. 676 $a956.7044/3 700 $aSerena$b Chad C$01636867 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910807917903321 996 $aIt takes more than a network$94011760 997 $aUNINA