LEADER 05619nam 2200733 a 450 001 9910807401003321 005 20240516185248.0 010 $a1-280-87952-1 010 $a9786613720832 010 $a90-272-7359-6 035 $a(CKB)2550000000109662 035 $a(EBL)949201 035 $a(OCoLC)797918086 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000687304 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12332344 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000687304 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10755968 035 $a(PQKB)11773964 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL949201 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10574855 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL372083 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC949201 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000109662 100 $a20120502d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aBeing in time$b[electronic resource] $edynamical models of phenomenal experience /$fedited by Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete, Neta Zach 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aAmsterdam ;$aPhiladelphia $cJohn Benjamins Pub. Co.$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (277 p.) 225 1 $aAdvances in consciousness research ;$vv. 88 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a90-272-1354-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aBeing in Time; Editorial page; Title page; LCC data; Table of contents; Introduction; Conclusion; Time after time; 1. Introduction: Ubiquitous time; 2. A middle way: Dynamical systems; 3. Brainspace; 4. Temporality now!; 5. Countdown to implementation; 6. Crossing the explanatory gap; Acknowledgements; References; Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness; 1. Introduction- the optimistic outlook; 2. The creative nature of visual perception; 3. A colossal library; 4. Building templates- hierarchically; 5. A combinatorial explosion; 6. The ambiguity inherent in isolated responses 327 $a7. Neuronal reflections8. Experimental consequences; 9. What is so unique about the cerebral cortex?; 10. Is consciousness a local or global phenomenon?; 11. Is visual awareness dependent on higher levels of the cortical hierarchy?; References; From probabilities to percepts; 1. Introduction; 2. The ubiquity of sensory ambiguity and its absence from sensory consciousness; 3. An orthogonal order of estimates and the 'precedence of the gaze'; 4. Design features of a global best estimate buffer; 4.1 The neural numerology of sensory experience 327 $a4.2 Our panoramic, nested, ego-centric, three-dimensional visual world4.3 "Just in time" for the next gaze movement: brief career of the global best estimate; 5. Cortex, colliculus and "the other thalamus"; 6. Conclusion; References; Being in time; 1. A few more constraints on theories of phenomenal experience; 1.1 Autonomy; 1.2 Timeliness; 1.3 Computational tractability; 2. Implications of the autonomy of experience; 3. Time is of the essence; 4. Waiting for Godot; 4.1 The attractor hypothesis; 4.2 The way ahead; 5. Computational tools for distributed dynamic coordination; 6. Summary 327 $aAcknowledgmentsReferences; The (lack of) mental life of some machines; 1. Introduction - special laws:; 2. One bit at a time; 3. How detailed is detailed enough?; 4. Not all machines are born equal; 5. Conclusion; Acknowledgements; References; Restless minds, wandering brains; 1. Introduction; 1.1 Escaping robustness; 2. Perceptual switching; 3. An EEG-study of perceptual mind wandering; 4. The dynamics of mind-wandering; 5. What happens to the laminar intervals when observers do engage in a task?; 6. Conclusion; Acknowledgement; References; Fuzzy consciousness; 1. Introduction 327 $a2. Cylinder sets3. The pushing and pulling of consciousness; 4. Discussion; References; Two dynamical themes in Husserl; 1. Background; 2. Horizon theory/constitution; 3. Transcendental-eidetic phenomenology; 4. Conclusion; References; Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness; 1. Introduction: Unity, holism, and temporal continuity; 2. Mereotopology as a new tool for the study of consciousness; 2. A critical application: Does an experience have temporal parts?; 3. "Self-embedding": Sketch of a positive proposal; 4. Conclusion; References; The brain and its states 327 $a1.Introduction 330 $aGiven that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood - indeed, can only be understood - as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, throu 410 0$aAdvances in consciousness research ;$vv. 88. 606 $aPhenomenological psychology 606 $aExperience$xPsychological aspects 606 $aConsciousness 606 $aTime 615 0$aPhenomenological psychology. 615 0$aExperience$xPsychological aspects. 615 0$aConsciousness. 615 0$aTime. 676 $a153 701 $aEdelman$b Shimon$01111771 701 $aFekete$b Tomer$01705417 701 $aZach$b Neta$01705418 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910807401003321 996 $aBeing in time$94092073 997 $aUNINA