LEADER 03462nam 2200637Ia 450 001 9910807341703321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4755-2021-2 010 $a1-4755-3924-X 035 $a(CKB)2670000000278823 035 $a(EBL)1606936 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000949374 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11521999 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000949374 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10996015 035 $a(PQKB)10526840 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1606936 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10627044 035 $a(OCoLC)805985260 035 $a(IMF)WPIEE2012204 035 $a(IMF)WPIEA2012204 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606936 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000278823 100 $a20111102d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDonor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation /$foprepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aWashington, DC $cInternational Monetary Fund$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (38 p.) 225 0 $aIMF working paper ;$v12/204 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4755-5957-7 311 $a1-4755-0554-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size 327 $a2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index 330 3 $aThis paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation. 410 0$aIMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;$vNo. 2012/204 606 $aEconomic assistance 606 $aFlow of funds 615 0$aEconomic assistance. 615 0$aFlow of funds. 676 $a337 700 $aAnnen$b Kurt$f1967-$01757068 701 $aMoers$b Luc$01676915 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910807341703321 996 $aDonor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation$94194713 997 $aUNINA