LEADER 01794nam 2200517Ia 450 001 9910456227903321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-309-50440-6 035 $a(CKB)111069351131834 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000099317 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11113484 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000099317 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10006838 035 $a(PQKB)10407788 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3375425 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3375425 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10038699 035 $a(OCoLC)923256358 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111069351131834 100 $a20030617d2003 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aAdvancing prion science$b[electronic resource] $eguidance for the National Prion Research Program, interim report /$fRick Erdtmann and Laura Sivitz, editors ; Committee on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies: Assessment of Relevant Science, Medical Follow-Up Agency, Institute of Medicine of the National Academies 210 $aWashington, D.C. $cThe National Academies Press$d2003 215 $axx, 105 p 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-309-08744-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 606 $aPrion diseases$xResearch$zUnited States 606 $aPrion diseases$xDiagnosis$zUnited States 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aPrion diseases$xResearch 615 0$aPrion diseases$xDiagnosis 676 $a616.8/3 701 $aErdtmann$b Rick$0986231 701 $aSivitz$b Laura$0986232 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910456227903321 996 $aAdvancing prion science$92254132 997 $aUNINA LEADER 02598nam 2200589 450 001 9910807132103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8131-6330-7 035 $a(CKB)3710000000334603 035 $a(EBL)1915807 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001431737 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11927735 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001431737 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11388613 035 $a(PQKB)10091213 035 $a(OCoLC)707585148 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse44324 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1915807 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11005562 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL691528 035 $a(OCoLC)900345208 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1915807 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000334603 100 $a20150123h19731973 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe banking crisis of 1933 /$fSusan Esfabrook Kennedy 210 1$aLexington, Kentucky :$cUniversity Press of Kentucky,$d1973. 210 4$dİ1973 215 $a1 online resource (280 p.) 300 $aBased on the author's thesis, Columbia University. 311 $a1-322-60246-8 311 $a0-8131-5291-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Chapter; Acknowledgments; I. PROSPERITY AND DEPRESSION; II. HOOVER'S SOLUTIONS; III. LECTION AND INTERREGNUM; IV. MICHIGAN; V. INVESTIGATION; VI. EXIT HOOVER; VII. ENTER ROOSEVELT; VIII. REOPENING; IX. THE BANKING ACT OF 1933; X. CONCLUSION; Selected Bibliography; Index; 330 $aOn March 6, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt, less than forty-eight hours after becoming president, ordered the suspension of all banking facilities in the United States. How the nation had reached such a desperate situation and how it responded to the banking ""holiday"" are examined in this book, the first full-length study of the crisis.Although the 1920's had witnessed a wave of bank failures, the situation worsened after the 1929 stock market crash, and by the winter of 1932-1933, complete banking collapse threatened much of the nation. President Hoover's stopgap measures proved totally inadequate 606 $aBanks and banking$zUnited States 606 $aBanking law$zUnited States 615 0$aBanks and banking 615 0$aBanking law 676 $a332.1/0973 700 $aKennedy$b Susan Estabrook$01643625 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910807132103321 996 $aThe banking crisis of 1933$93988977 997 $aUNINA