LEADER 05912nam 2200625Ia 450 001 9910806102703321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-61209-871-1 035 $a(CKB)2560000000070870 035 $a(EBL)3019070 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000467505 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12156517 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000467505 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10489803 035 $a(PQKB)10021547 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3019070 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3019070 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10662877 035 $a(OCoLC)699507793 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000070870 100 $a20090806d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCarbon tax and cap-and-trade tools $emarket-based approaches for controlling greenhouse gases /$fNelson E. Burney, editor 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aNew York $cNova Science Publishers$dc2010 215 $a1 online resource (128 p.) 225 1 $aClimate change and its causes, effects and prediction series 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-60876-137-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aIntro -- CARBON TAX AND CAP-AND-TRADE TOOLS: MARKET-BASED APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GASES -- CARBON TAX AND CAP-AND-TRADE TOOLS: MARKET-BASED APPROACHES FOR CONTROLLING GREENHOUSE GASES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- CARBON TAX AND GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL: OPTIONS ANDCONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- OTHER POLICY OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSINGGHG EMISSIONS -- COST OF QUANTITY CONTROL: AN OVERVIEW -- Economic Theory vs. Uncertainty -- A Stark Choice or a Policy Continuum? -- A Flexible Emissions Cap -- A Flexible Carbon Tax -- Limits of the Policy Continuum -- POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF A CARBON TAX -- Economic Efficiency -- Basis for the Argument -- Underpinnings of the Argument -- Relative Flatness of Benefits Curve? -- Relative Steepness of the Marginal Cost Curve? -- Short-Term Time Frame -- Only Cost Uncertainty is Considered -- Modeled Eficiency Gains -- Economic Efficiency versus Precaution -- Price Stability -- Tax Revenue Applications -- Potential Implementation Advantages -- Transparency -- Administrative Issues -- Policy Modification -- POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES -- Uncertain Emissions -- Political Feasibility -- What's in a Name? -- THE ROLE OF COMMITTEE JURISDICTION -- Support from Industry? -- Support from Environmental Groups? -- Consideration of International Efforts and Cooperation -- Coordination with Existing International Efforts -- Maximizing Participation -- International Implementation Concerns -- IMPLEMENTATION OF A CARBON TAX -- Point of Taxation -- Where to Impose a Carbon Tax? -- CO2 Emissions or All CHG Emission? -- THE 1993 ENERGY OR BTU TAX -- Which Emission Sources to Control? -- Level of Taxation -- Tax Based on Estimates of Costs and Benefits117 -- Social Cost of Carbon Estimates -- Applying Social Cost of Carbon Estimates -- Tax Based on Meeting an Emissions Target -- Tax Revenue Distribution. 327 $aEstimates of Tax Revenues -- Use of Tax Revenues -- Offset Reductions in Other Taxes -- Direct or Indirect Payments to Households -- Provide Assitance to Carbon-Intensive Industries -- Fund Specific Objectives -- Policy Considerations of Different Revenue Applications -- Overall Costs to Society -- Distributional Impacts -- Carbon-Intensive Industries -- Technology Development -- CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION -- End Notes -- IMPLICATIONS OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS -- FLEXIBILITY IN THE TIMING OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS -- Potential Savings in Costs As a Result of Timing Flexibility -- Design Features That Provide Firms with Timing Flexibility -- Keeping Costs from Climbing Too High -- Keeping Costs from Falling Too Low -- THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM -- Market Forces Would Determine Who Bore the Costs of a Cap -- BOX 1. CBO'S COST ESTIMATE FOR S. 2191 -- Policymakers Would Determine Who Received the Value of the Allowances -- REDUCING THE OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACTOF A CO2 CAP -- CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET -- End Notes -- ISSUES IN DESIGNING A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS -- HOW A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM WOULD WORK -- THE POTENTIAL VALUE AND BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF ALLOWANCES -- THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM -- Market Forces Would Determine Who Bore the Costs of a Cap -- Policymakers Would Determine Who Received the Value of the Allowances -- REDUCING THE OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACTOF A CO2 CAP -- Using the Allowance Value to Reduce the Total Economic Cost -- ALLOWING FLEXIBILITY IN THE TIMING OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS TO LOWER COSTS -- Design Features Providing Flexibility in the Timing of Emission Reductions -- A Price Ceiling and a Price Floor -- Borrowing and Banking Allowances -- Aggregate Borrowing by Regulators. 327 $aDesign Features Addressing Energy-Intensive Manufacturing Industries -- Border Adjustments -- Transitional Assistance -- Compatibility with WTO Agreements -- End Notes -- CHAPTER SOURCES -- INDEX. 410 0$aClimate change and its causes, effects, and prediction series. 606 $aEmissions trading$zUnited States 606 $aCarbon taxes$zUnited States 606 $aAir quality management$zUnited States 606 $aGreenhouse gas mitigation$zUnited States 615 0$aEmissions trading 615 0$aCarbon taxes 615 0$aAir quality management 615 0$aGreenhouse gas mitigation 676 $a363.738/746 700 $aBurney$b Nelson E$01672653 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910806102703321 996 $aCarbon tax and cap-and-trade tools$94036134 997 $aUNINA