LEADER 03722nam 2200589 450 001 9910798611203321 005 20230808195443.0 010 $a3-11-061175-9 010 $a3-11-049184-2 024 7 $a10.1515/9783110494129 035 $a(CKB)3710000000862282 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4691443 035 $a(DE-B1597)469442 035 $a(OCoLC)959427507 035 $a(DE-B1597)9783110494129 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4691443 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11268072 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL956131 035 $a(OCoLC)959149771 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000862282 100 $a20161010h20162016 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $2rdacontent 182 $2rdamedia 183 $2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe bounds of freedom $eKant's causal theory of action /$fRobert Greenberg 210 1$aBerlin, [Germany] ;$aBoston, [Massachusetts] :$cDe Gruyter,$d2016. 210 4$d©2016 215 $a1 online resource (146 pages) 225 0 $aKantstudien-Erga?nzungshefte,$x0340-6059 ;$vBand 191 311 $a3-11-049412-4 311 $a3-11-049466-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tAcknowledgements -- $tPreface -- $t1. Introduction -- $t2. Causal Theories of Objects and Grice?s Causal Theory of Perception -- $t3. Kant?s Theory of Practical Causality -- $t4. Conscience: Remembering One?s Forbidden Actions -- $t5. The New Problem of the Imputability of Actions -- $t6. Maxims and Categorical Imperatives -- $t7. Necessity and Practical A Priori Knowledge: Kant and Kripke -- $t8. The Bounds of Freedom -- $tReferences -- $tSubject index 330 $aThis monograph is a new interpretation of Kant?s ątemporal conception of the causality of the freedom of the will. The interpretation is based on an analysis of Kant?s primary conception of an action, viz., as a causal consequence of the will. The analysis in turn is based on H. P. Grice?s causal theory of perception and on P. F. Strawson?s modification of the theory. The monograph rejects the customary assumption that Kant?s maxim of an action is a causal determination of the action. It assumes instead that the maxim is definitive of the action, and since its main thesis is that an action for Kant is to be primarily understood as an effect of the will, it concludes that the maxim of an action can only be its logical determination. Kant?s ątemporal conception of the causality of free will is confronted not only by contemporary philosophical conceptions of causality, but by Kant?s own complementary theory of causality, in the Second Analogy of Experience. According to this latter conception, causality is a natural relation among physical and psychological objects, and is therefore a temporal relation among them. Faced with this conflict, Kant scholars like Allen W. Wood either reject Kant?s ątemporal conception of causality or like Henry E. Allison accept it, but only in an anodyne form. Both camps, however, make the aforementioned assumption that Kant?s maxim of an action is a causal determination of the action. The monograph, rejecting the assumption, belongs to neither camp. 606 $aAct (Philosophy) 606 $aFree will and determinism 610 $aGrice, H. P. 610 $aKant, Immanuel. 610 $afree will. 615 0$aAct (Philosophy) 615 0$aFree will and determinism. 676 $a128/.4092 700 $aGreenberg$b Robert$f1934-$01544954 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910798611203321 996 $aThe bounds of freedom$93800434 997 $aUNINA