LEADER 03232nam 22005295 450 001 9910798207503321 005 20240102112708.0 010 $a9780300221084 (e-book) 010 $a9780300163803 (hbk.) 010 $a9780300230512 (pbk.) 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300221084 035 $a(CKB)3710000000654099 035 $a(EBL)4518776 035 $a(DE-B1597)540178 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300221084 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4518776 035 $a(OCoLC)948286648 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000654099 100 $a20200229h20162016 fg 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn#---|u||u 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe Moral Economy $eWhy Good Incentives Are No Substitute for Good Citizens /$fSamuel Bowles 210 1$aNew Haven, CT :$cYale University Press,$d[2016] 210 4$dİ2016 215 $a1 online resource (289 p.) 225 0 $aCastle Lecture Series 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tPreface --$tI. The Problem with Homo economicus --$tII. A Constitution for Knaves --$tIII. Moral Sentiments and Material Interests --$tIV. Incentives as Information --$tV. A Liberal Civic Culture --$tVI. The Legislator's Dilemma --$tVII. A Mandate for Aristotle's Legislator --$tAPPENDIX 1. A Taxonomy of Additive Separability and Its Violations --$tAPPENDIX 2. Experimental Games Measuring Social Preferences and the Effects of Incentives --$tAPPENDIX 3. Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of the Subsidy in the Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008) Experiment --$tAPPENDIX 4. Trust and the Liberal Rule of Law --$tNotes --$tWorks Cited --$tIndex 330 $aWhy do policies and business practices that ignore the moral and generous side of human nature often fail? Should the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends. 410 0$aCastle Lectures 606 $aEconomics$xMoral and ethical aspects 606 $aLaw and economics 615 0$aEconomics$xMoral and ethical aspects. 615 0$aLaw and economics. 676 $a174.4 686 $aCC 7262$2rvk 700 $aBowles$b Samuel$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0119363 801 0$bDE-B1597 801 1$bDE-B1597 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910798207503321 996 $aThe Moral Economy$93766451 997 $aUNINA