LEADER 04067nam 2200745 450 001 9910798085703321 005 20230807221554.0 010 $a1-5017-0162-2 024 7 $a10.7591/9781501701627 035 $a(CKB)3710000000462299 035 $a(EBL)3425996 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001544175 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16136370 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001544175 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)13689766 035 $a(PQKB)10333607 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001516746 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3425996 035 $a(OCoLC)1080549545 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse58378 035 $a(DE-B1597)478316 035 $a(OCoLC)918561620 035 $a(OCoLC)932570063 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781501701627 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3425996 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11090349 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000462299 100 $a20150204d2015 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDeceit on the road to war $epresidents, politics, and American democracy /$fJohn M. Schuessler 210 1$aIthaca :$cCornell University Press,$d2015. 215 $a1 online resource (191 p.) 225 1 $aCornell studies in security affairs 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-5017-0161-4 311 $a0-8014-5359-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aDeception in democracies -- Shifting blame to the Axis : FDR's undeclared war -- Shifting blame to the communists : LBJ and the Vietnam War -- Overselling the Iraq War. 330 $aIn Deceit on the Road to War, John M. Schuessler examines how U.S. presidents have deceived the American public about fundamental decisions of war and peace. Deception has been deliberate, he suggests, as presidents have sought to shift blame for war onto others in some cases and oversell its benefits in others. Such deceit is a natural outgrowth of the democratic process, in Schuessler's view, because elected leaders have powerful incentives to maximize domestic support for war and retain considerable ability to manipulate domestic audiences. They can exploit information and propaganda advantages to frame issues in misleading ways, cherry-pick supporting evidence, suppress damaging revelations, and otherwise skew the public debate to their benefit. These tactics are particularly effective before the outbreak of war, when the information gap between leaders and the public is greatest.When resorting to deception, leaders take a calculated risk that the outcome of war will be favorable, expecting the public to adopt a forgiving attitude after victory is secured. The three cases featured in the book-Franklin Roosevelt and World War II, Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War, and George W. Bush and the Iraq War-test these claims. Schuessler concludes that democracies are not as constrained in their ability to go to war as we might believe and that deception cannot be ruled out in all cases as contrary to the national interest. 410 0$aCornell studies in security affairs. 606 $aPolitics and war$zUnited States$xHistory 606 $aDeception$xPolitical aspects$zUnited States$xHistory 606 $aPolitical leadership$zUnited States$xHistory 606 $aWorld War, 1939-1945$xDeception$zUnited States 606 $aVietnam War, 1961-1975$xDeception$zUnited States 606 $aIraq War, 2003-2011$xDeception$zUnited States 615 0$aPolitics and war$xHistory. 615 0$aDeception$xPolitical aspects$xHistory. 615 0$aPolitical leadership$xHistory. 615 0$aWorld War, 1939-1945$xDeception 615 0$aVietnam War, 1961-1975$xDeception 615 0$aIraq War, 2003-2011$xDeception 676 $a355.02/720973 700 $aSchuessler$b John M.$f1977-$01472759 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910798085703321 996 $aDeceit on the road to war$93685658 997 $aUNINA