LEADER 04324nam 2200673 450 001 9910798084103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-12-802354-6 010 $a0-12-802122-5 035 $a(CKB)3710000000461244 035 $a(EBL)2146995 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001599686 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16306785 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001599686 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)14892477 035 $a(PQKB)10983075 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL2146995 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11088212 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL822659 035 $a(OCoLC)918841118 035 $a(CaSebORM)9780128023549 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC2146995 035 $a(PPN)198680422 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000461244 100 $a20150825h20152015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aSmart grid security $einnovative solutions for a modernized grid /$fedited by Florian Skopik, Paul Smith ; designer, Mark Rogers ; contributors, Stylianos Basagiannis [and twenty three others] 205 $a1st edition 210 1$aAmsterdam, [Netherlands] :$cSyngress,$d2015. 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (330 p.) 225 0 $aSyngress Advanced Topics in Information Security 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters and index. 327 $a2.6.2.1 - The First Regulatory Experiment: The RFID PIA Framework2.6.2.2 - The Second Regulatory Experiment: The DPIA Framework for Smart Grids and Smart Metering Systems; 2.7 - The EU "light" regulatory approach to Personal Data Protection in Smart Grids: an evaluation; 2.8 - Conclusion: DPIA Testing is a First Good Step but a more inclusive, easy to apply and flexible solution is necessary; 2.8.1 - A missed opportunity?; 2.8.2 - Recommendation 1: the governance of emerging technologies should carefully combine regulatory strategies 327 $a2.8.3 - Recommendation 2: Impact assessments of emerging technologies should be inclusive, easy to use and flexibleAcronyms; References; Chapter 3 - The Evolution of the Smart Grid Threat Landscape and Cross-Domain Risk Assessment; 3.1 - Introduction; 3.2 - Smart Grid Architectures: The Basics; 3.2.1 - GridWise Interoperability Context-Setting Framework; 3.2.2 - NIST Smart Grid Framework; 3.2.3 - Smart Grid Architecture Model and EU Mandate M490; 3.3 - Smart Grid Threat Landscape; 3.3.1 - Threat Types; 3.3.2 - Threat Agents; 3.3.3 - Attack Vectors; 3.3.4 - Case Studies 327 $a3.3.4.1 - Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)3.3.4.2 - Wide Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control (WAMPAC); 3.3.4.3 - Distribution Grid Management (DGM); 3.4 - Smart Grid Risk Assessment; 3.4.1 - Basic Concepts; 3.4.2 - Main Challenges; 3.4.2.1 - Managing Safety and Security Risks; 3.4.2.2 - Analysing Cyber-physical Risks; 3.4.2.3 - Understanding the Risks to Legacy Systems; 3.4.2.4 - Complex Organisational Dependencies; 3.4.2.5 - Understanding Cascading Effects; 3.4.3 - Existing Risk Assessment Frameworks; 3.5 - Conclusion; Acronyms; References 327 $aChapter 4 - Resilience Against Physical Attacks 330 $a The Smart Grid security ecosystem is complex and multi-disciplinary, and relatively under-researched compared to the traditional information and network security disciplines. While the Smart Grid has provided increased efficiencies in monitoring power usage, directing power supplies to serve peak power needs and improving efficiency of power delivery, the Smart Grid has also opened the way for information security breaches and other types of security breaches. Potential threats range from meter manipulation to directed, high-impact attacks on critical infrastructure that could bring down regi 606 $aSmart power grids 606 $aComputer security 615 0$aSmart power grids. 615 0$aComputer security. 676 $a621.319 702 $aSkopik$b Florian 702 $aSmith$b Paul 702 $aRogers$b Mark 702 $aBasagiannis$b Stylianos 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910798084103321 996 $aSmart grid security$92122385 997 $aUNINA