LEADER 04145nam 2200637 450 001 9910797718203321 005 20230808212714.0 010 $a0-8047-9677-7 024 7 $a10.1515/9780804796774 035 $a(CKB)3710000000529593 035 $a(EBL)4414748 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001581826 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16259564 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001581826 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)13419489 035 $a(PQKB)10671115 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4414748 035 $a(DE-B1597)564400 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780804796774 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4414748 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11176337 035 $a(OCoLC)943574060 035 $a(OCoLC)1198930929 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000529593 100 $a20150805h20162016 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe polythink syndrome $eU.S. foreign policy decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and ISIS /$fAlex Mintz and Carly Wayne 210 1$aStanford, California :$cStanford University Press,$d[2016] 210 4$dİ2016 215 $a1 online resource (201 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-8047-9676-9 311 $a0-8047-9515-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aThe polythink syndrome -- Causes, symptoms, and consequences of polythink -- Polythink in national security : the 9/11 attacks -- Polythink and Afghanistan war decisions : war initiation and termination -- Decision making in the Iraq War: from groupthink to polythink -- Polythink in the Iranian nuclear dispute : decisions of the U.S. and Israel -- Recent challenges : the Syria debate, the renewed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and the ISIS decision -- The global nature of polythink and its productive potential. 330 $aWhy do presidents and their advisors often make sub-optimal decisions on military intervention, escalation, de-escalation, and termination of conflicts? The leading concept of group dynamics, groupthink, offers one explanation: policy-making groups make sub-optimal decisions due to their desire for conformity and uniformity over dissent, leading to a failure to consider other relevant possibilities. But presidential advisory groups are often fragmented and divisive. This book therefore scrutinizes polythink, a group decision-making dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and divergent policy prescriptions, resulting in a disjointed decision-making process or even decision paralysis. The book analyzes eleven national security decisions, including the national security policy designed prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the decisions to enter into and withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2007 "surge" decision, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, the UN Security Council decision on the Syrian Civil War, the faltering Kerry Peace Process in the Middle East, and the U.S. decision on military operations against ISIS. Based on the analysis of these case studies, the authors address implications of the polythink phenomenon, including prescriptions for avoiding and/or overcoming it, and develop strategies and tools for what they call Productive Polythink. The authors also show the applicability of polythink to business, industry, and everyday decisions. 606 $aNational security$zUnited States$xDecision making$vCase studies 606 $aGroup decision making$zUnited States$vCase studies 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y2001-2009$xDecision making$vCase studies 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y2009-$xDecision making$vCase studies 615 0$aNational security$xDecision making 615 0$aGroup decision making 676 $a327.73056 700 $aMintz$b Alex$f1953-$0126358 702 $aWayne$b Carly 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910797718203321 996 $aThe polythink syndrome$93791171 997 $aUNINA