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100   $a20151124h20152015  uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|nu---|u||u
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aTowards a theory of epistemically significant perception $ehow we relate to the world /$fNadja El Kassar
210  1$aBerlin, [Germany] :$cDe Gruyter,$d2015.
210  4$dİ2015
215   $a1 online resource (376 p.)
225 1 $aIdeen & Argumente,$x1862-1147
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a3-11-057827-1 
311   $a3-11-044521-2 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes.
327   $tFront matter --$tAcknowledgments --$tContents --$tIntroduction --$tPart I Conceptualism --$t1 Introducing Conceptualism --$t2 Examining Non-Conceptualist Arguments against Conceptualism --$t3 Examining McDowell's Revised Conceptualism --$tPart II Relationism --$t4 Relationism: Perception as Conscious Acquaintance --$t5 Relationism as Anti-Representationalism --$t6 Why McDowell's Revised Conceptualism Does Not Avoid Travis's Anti-Representationalist Criticism --$tPart III Relational Conceptualism --$t7 Relational Conceptualism: a Theory of Epistemically Significant Perception --$t8 Possible Objections against Relational Conceptualism --$tPart IV. Relational Conceptualism and Empirical Science --$t9 Broadening the Scope of Relational Conceptualism --$tReferences --$tAuthor Index --$tSubject Index
330   $aHow does perceptual experience make us knowledgeable about the world? In this book Nadja El Kassar argues that an informed answer requires a novel theory of perception: perceptual experience involves conceptual capacities and consists in a relation between a perceiver and the world. Contemporary theories of perception disagree about the role of content and conceptual capacities in perceptual experience. In her analysis El Kassar scrutinizes the arguments of conceptualist and relationist theories, thereby exposing their limitations for explaining the epistemic role of perceptual experience. Against this background she develops her novel theory of epistemically significant perception. Her theory improves on current accounts by encompassing both the epistemic role of perceptual experiences and its perceptual character. Central claims of her theory receive additional support from work in vision science, making this book an original contribution to the philosophy of perception.
410  0$aIdeen & Argumente.
606   $aPerception (Philosophy)
606   $aConceptualism
606   $aRelationism
610   $aConceptualism.
610   $aperception.
610   $arelationism.
615  0$aPerception (Philosophy)
615  0$aConceptualism.
615  0$aRelationism.
676   $a121/.34
700   $aEl Kassar$b Nadja$f1984-$01005149
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910797646703321
996   $aTowards a theory of epistemically significant perception$92310332
997   $aUNINA