LEADER 04474nam 2200673 450 001 9910797408903321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-5017-0154-1 010 $a1-5017-0155-X 024 7 $a10.7591/9781501701559 035 $a(CKB)3710000000470682 035 $a(EBL)4189252 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001544947 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)16134783 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001544947 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)13782930 035 $a(PQKB)11018520 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001510552 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4189252 035 $a(OCoLC)1016808926 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse56395 035 $a(DE-B1597)478518 035 $a(OCoLC)919921402 035 $a(OCoLC)979743433 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781501701559 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000470682 100 $a20151228h20152015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|nu---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aReassuring the reluctant warriors $eU.S. civil-military relations and multilateral intervention /$fStefano Recchia 210 1$aIthaca, New York ;$aLondon, [England] :$cCornell University Press,$d2015. 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (296 p.) 225 1 $aCornell Studies in Security Affairs 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-8014-5291-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tPreface --$tAbbreviations --$tIntroduction: Multilateralism and the Generals --$t1. The Value of Multilateral Legitimacy --$t2. Institutions, Burden Sharing, and the American Military --$t3. Haiti, 1993-94: Multilateral Approval to Ensure a UN Handoff --$t4. Bosnia, 1992-95: Keeping the U.S. Military from "Owning" It --$t5. Kosovo, 1998-99: Reassuring the Generals With NATO's Buy-In --$t6. Iraq, 2002-3: Silence from the Generals --$tConclusion --$tAppendix: List of Officials Interviewed --$tReferences --$tIndex 330 $aWhy did American leaders work hard to secure multilateral approval from the United Nations or NATO for military interventions in Haiti, the Balkans, and Libya, while making only limited efforts to gain such approval for the 2003 Iraq War? In Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, Stefano Recchia addresses this important question by drawing on declassified documents and about one hundred interviews with civilian and military leaders. The most assertive, hawkish, and influential civilian leaders, he argues, tend to downplay the costs of intervention, and when confronted with hesitant international partners they often want to bypass multilateral bodies. America's top-level generals, by contrast, are usually "reluctant warriors" who worry that intervention will result in open-ended stabilization missions; consequently, the military craves international burden sharing and values the potential exit ramp for U.S. forces that a handoff to the UN or NATO can provide. Recchia demonstrates that when the military speaks up and clearly expresses its concerns, even strongly pro-intervention civilian leaders can be expected to work hard to secure UN or NATO approval-if only to reassure the military about the likelihood of sustained burden sharing. Conversely, when the military stays silent, as it did in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, bellicose civilian leaders are empowered; the United States is then more likely to bypass multilateral bodies, and it may end up carrying a heavy stabilization burden largely by itself. Recchia's argument that the military has the ability to contribute not only to a more prudent but also to a more multilateralist U.S. intervention policy may be counterintuitive, but the evidence is compelling. 410 0$aCornell studies in security affairs. 606 $aIntervention (International law)$vCase studies 606 $aMultinational armed forces$vCase studies 606 $aCivil-military relations$zUnited States$vCase studies 607 $aUnited States$xMilitary policy$xDecision making$vCase studies 615 0$aIntervention (International law) 615 0$aMultinational armed forces 615 0$aCivil-military relations 676 $a322/.50973 700 $aRecchia$b Stefano$f1978-$01491100 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910797408903321 996 $aReassuring the reluctant warriors$93712700 997 $aUNINA