LEADER 03257oam 2200613I 450 001 9910797353903321 005 20190503073426.0 010 $a0-262-32965-4 010 $a0-262-32964-6 035 $a(CKB)3710000000445850 035 $a(EBL)3433789 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001518212 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12612588 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001518212 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11509833 035 $a(PQKB)10680947 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001280897 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3433789 035 $a(OCoLC)913956516 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse47271 035 $a(OCoLC)913956516$z(OCoLC)938434022$z(OCoLC)990398251 035 $a(OCoLC-P)913956516 035 $a(MaCbMITP)10139 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3433789 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11078249 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL814205 035 $a(EXLCZ)993710000000445850 100 $a20150717h20152015 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAgainst facts /$fArianna Betti 210 1$aCambridge, Massachusetts ;$aLondon, England :$cMIT Press,$d[2015] 210 4$dİ2015 215 $a1 online resource (325 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-262-02921-9 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aI. Compositional facts -- II. Propositional facts. 330 $a"In this book Arianna Betti argues that we have no good reason to accept facts in our catalog of the world, at least as they are described by the two major metaphysical theories of facts. She claims that neither of these theories is tenable--neither the theory according to which facts are special structured building blocks of reality nor the theory according to which facts are whatever is named by certain expressions of the form 'the fact that such and such.' There is reality, and there are entities in reality that we are able to name, but, Betti contends, among these entities there are no facts. Drawing on metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics, Betti examines the main arguments in favor of and against facts of the two major sorts, which she distinguishes as compositional and propositional, giving special attention to methodological presuppositions. She criticizes compositional facts (facts as special structured building blocks of reality) and the central argument for them, Armstrong's truthmaker argument. She then criticizes propositional facts (facts as whatever is named in "the fact that" statements) and what she calls the argument from nominal reference, which draws on Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Betti argues that metaphysicians should stop worrying about facts, and philosophers in general should stop arguing for or against entities on the basis of how we use language"--MIT CogNet. 606 $aFacts (Philosophy) 610 $aPHILOSOPHY/General 610 $aLINGUISTICS & LANGUAGE/General 615 0$aFacts (Philosophy) 676 $a111 700 $aBetti$b Arianna$f1970-$01553712 801 0$bOCoLC-P 801 1$bOCoLC-P 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910797353903321 996 $aAgainst facts$93814443 997 $aUNINA