LEADER 03917nam 2200625Ia 450 001 9910792186503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8047-8556-2 024 7 $a10.1515/9780804785563 035 $a(CKB)2560000000102293 035 $a(EBL)1210892 035 $a(OCoLC)849787063 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000915460 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12431726 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000915460 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10868915 035 $a(PQKB)11221706 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1210892 035 $a(DE-B1597)564864 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780804785563 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1210892 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10718274 035 $a(OCoLC)873805531 035 $a(OCoLC)1178770226 035 $a(PPN)248789333 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000102293 100 $a20130220d2013 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCollective action and exchange$b[electronic resource] $ea game-theoretic approach to contemporary political economy /$fWilliam D. Ferguson 210 $aStanford, California $cStanford Economics and Finance, an imprint of Stanford University Press$d2013 215 $a1 online resource (447 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-8047-7003-4 311 $a0-8047-7004-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIntroduction: A Farmer?s Market -- $tChapter 1 Collective-Action Problems and Innovative Theory -- $tChapter 2 The Basic Economics of Collective Action -- $tChapter 3 Coordination, Enforcement, and Second-Order Collective-Action Problems -- $tChapter 4 Seizing Advantage: Strategic Moves and Power in Exchange -- $tChapter 5 Basic Motivation: Rational Egoists and Reciprocal Players -- $tChapter 6 Foundations of Motivation: Rationality and Social Preference -- $tChapter 7 Institutions, Organizations, and Institutional Systems -- $tChapter 8 Informal Institutions -- $tChapter 9 Internal Resolution via Group Self-Organization -- $tChapter 10 Third-Party Enforcement, Formal Institutions, and Interactions with Self-Governance -- $tChapter 11 Social Networks and Collective Action -- $tChapter 12 Policy and Political Economy -- $tAppendix to Chapter 12 -- $tChapter 13 Knowledge, Collective Action, Institutions, Location, and Growth -- $tChapter 14 Conclusion -- $tNotes -- $tReferences -- $tIndex 330 $aIn Collective Action and Exchange: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Contemporary Political Economy, William D. Ferguson presents a comprehensive political economy text aimed at advanced undergraduates in economics and graduate students in the social sciences. The text utilizes collective action as a unifying concept, arguing that collective-action problems lie at the foundation of market success, market failure, economic development, and the motivations for policy. Ferguson draws on information economics, social preference theory, cognition theory, institutional economics, as well as political and policy theory to develop this approach. The text uses classical, evolutionary, and epistemic game theory, along with basic social network analysis, as modeling frameworks. These models effectively bind the ideas presented, generating a coherent theoretic approach to political economy that stresses sometimes overlooked implications. 606 $aGame theory 606 $aEconomics$xMathematical models 615 0$aGame theory. 615 0$aEconomics$xMathematical models. 676 $a330.01/5193 686 $aQM 000$2rvk 700 $aFerguson$b William D.$f1953-$01538279 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910792186503321 996 $aCollective action and exchange$93788269 997 $aUNINA