LEADER 04016nam 2200601Ia 450 001 9910791935203321 005 20230802012633.0 010 $a0-674-06477-1 010 $a0-674-06848-3 024 7 $a10.4159/harvard.9780674064775 035 $a(CKB)2560000000082528 035 $a(OCoLC)794004241 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10568023 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000659551 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11401644 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000659551 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10695779 035 $a(PQKB)10319157 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3301080 035 $a(DE-B1597)178154 035 $a(OCoLC)840443530 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674064775 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3301080 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10568023 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000082528 100 $a20110923d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhen words are called for$b[electronic resource] $ea defense of ordinary language philosophy /$fAvner Baz 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cHarvard University Press$dc2012 215 $a1 online resource (257 p.) 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-674-05522-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $tIntroduction -- $tChapter 1. The Basic Conflict - An Initial Characterization -- $tChapter 2. The Main Arguments against Ordinary Language Philosophy -- $tChapter 3. Must Philosophers Rely on Intuitions? -- $tChapter 4. Contextualism and the Burden of Knowledge -- $tChapter 5. Contextualism, Anti-Contextualism, and Knowing as Being in a Position to Give Assurance -- $tConclusion: Skepticism and the Dialectic of (Semantically Pure) 'Knowledge' -- $tEpilogue: Ordinary Language Philosophy, Kant, and the Roots of Antinomial Thinking -- $tReferences -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIndex 330 $aA new form of philosophizing known as ordinary language philosophy took root in England after the Second World War, promising a fresh start and a way out of long-standing dead-end philosophical debates. Pioneered by Wittgenstein, Austin, and others, OLP is now widely rumored, within mainstream analytic philosophy, to have been seriously discredited, and consequently its perspective is ignored. Avner Baz begs to differ. In When Words Are Called For, he shows how the prevailing arguments against OLP collapse under close scrutiny. All of them, he claims, presuppose one version or another of the very conception of word-meaning that OLP calls into question and takes to be responsible for many traditional philosophical difficulties. Worse, analytic philosophy itself has suffered as a result of its failure to take OLP's perspective seriously. Baz blames a neglect of OLP's insights for seemingly irresolvable disputes over the methodological relevance of "intuitions" in philosophy and for misunderstandings between contextualists and anti-contextualists (or "invariantists") in epistemology. Baz goes on to explore the deep affinities between Kant's work and OLP and suggests ways that OLP could be applied to other philosophically troublesome concepts. When Words Are Called For defends OLP not as a doctrine but as a form of practice that might provide a viable alternative to work currently carried out within mainstream analytic philosophy. Accordingly, Baz does not merely argue for OLP but, all the more convincingly, practices it in this eye-opening book. 606 $aOrdinary-language philosophy 606 $aLanguage and languages$xPhilosophy 615 0$aOrdinary-language philosophy. 615 0$aLanguage and languages$xPhilosophy. 676 $a149/.94 686 $aCC 4800$2rvk 700 $aBaz$b Avner$f1964-$0972172 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910791935203321 996 $aWhen words are called for$93690063 997 $aUNINA