LEADER 04380nam 2200697 a 450 001 9910791593103321 005 20220214111122.0 010 $a1-282-96497-6 010 $a9786612964978 010 $a1-4008-3785-5 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400837854 035 $a(CKB)2560000000048865 035 $a(EBL)664576 035 $a(OCoLC)707067730 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000986417 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11575344 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000986417 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10933654 035 $a(PQKB)10595589 035 $a(OCoLC)870412996 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36720 035 $a(WaSeSS)Ind00072144 035 $a(DE-B1597)446748 035 $a(OCoLC)979905236 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400837854 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL664576 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10443119 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL296497 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC664576 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000048865 100 $a20110311h20082006 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aUnanswered threats$b[electronic resource] $epolitical constraints on the balance of power /$fRandall L. Schweller 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$d2008, c2006 215 $a1 online resource (197 p.) 225 1 $aPrinceton studies in international history and politics 300 $aSecond printing, and first paperback printing, 2008. 311 $a0-691-12425-6 311 $a0-691-13646-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter --$tContents --$tIllustrations --$tPreface --$tIntroduction: Balance of Power and the Puzzle of Underbalancing Behavior --$tChapter 1. Prudence in Managing Changes in the Balance of Power --$tChapter 2. A Theory of Underbalancing: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation --$tChapter 3. Great-Power Case Studies: Interwar France and Britain, and France, 1877-1913 --$tChapter 4. Small-Power Case Studies: Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, and the War of the Triple Alliance, 1864-1870 --$tChapter 5. Why Are States So Timid? State Coherence and Expansion in the Age of Mass Politics --$tNotes --$tBibliography --$tIndex 330 $aWhy have states throughout history regularly underestimated dangers to their survival? Why have some states been able to mobilize their material resources effectively to balance against threats, while others have not been able to do so? The phenomenon of "underbalancing" is a common but woefully underexamined behavior in international politics. Underbalancing occurs when states fail to recognize dangerous threats, choose not to react to them, or respond in paltry and imprudent ways. It is a response that directly contradicts the core prediction of structural realism's balance-of-power theory--that states motivated to survive as autonomous entities are coherent actors that, when confronted by dangerous threats, act to restore the disrupted balance by creating alliances or increasing their military capabilities, or, in some cases, a combination of both. Consistent with the new wave of neoclassical realist research, Unanswered Threats offers a theory of underbalancing based on four domestic-level variables--elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and regime/government vulnerability--that channel, mediate, and redirect policy responses to external pressures and incentives. The theory yields five causal schemes for underbalancing behavior, which are tested against the cases of interwar Britain and France, France from 1877 to 1913, and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870) that pitted tiny Paraguay against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Randall Schweller concludes that those most likely to underbalance are incoherent, fragmented states whose elites are constrained by political considerations. 410 0$aPrinceton studies in international history and politics. 606 $aBalance of power$xHistory 606 $aBalance of power$vCase studies 615 0$aBalance of power$xHistory. 615 0$aBalance of power 676 $a327.1/12 700 $aSchweller$b Randall L$0969375 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910791593103321 996 $aUnanswered threats$93811533 997 $aUNINA