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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aBetween deflationism & correspondence theory /$fMatthew McGrath
210  1$aLondon :$cRoutledge,$d2013.
215   $a1 online resource (282 p.)
225 0 $aStudies in Philosophy
300   $aFirst published 2000 by Garland Publishing Inc.
311   $a0-8153-3852-X 
311   $a1-306-38511-3 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $aCover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Preface; 1. Realism about Propositions and Properties; I. Introduction; II. Ontological Commitment; III. Are Properties and Contents on a Par with Sakes and Average Persons?; IV. Ackerman's Triviality Charge; V. Properties and Concepts? Propositions and States of Affairs?; 2. Deflationism Rejected, Weak Deflationism Presented; 3. Questions for Weak Deflationism; I. Is Weak Deflationism Circular?; II. Why Shouldn't One Seek a Correspondence Theory of Propositional Truth?
327   $aIII. Does Weak Deflationism Stumble on the Explanation of General Facts Involving TruthIV. Does Weak Deflationism Have the Resources to Explain the Obviousness of Propositions Expressed by Instances of the Schema 'p' is true iff p?; V. Can the Weak Deflationist Answer the Standard Objection to Correspondence Theories that if Truth Consisted in Correspondence with the Facts, Knowing Something is True would Require an Absurd Comparison between Sentences (Utterances, Beliefs) and Facts?
327   $aVI. Is Weak Deflationism Incompatible with Non-Factual ist Theories of Certain Areas of Declarative Discourse, e.g., Moral Discourse?VII. Why Can't We Use Higher-Order Quantification to Formulate Deflationism about Propositional Truth as a Universalized Biconditional?; 4. A Challenge from David Lewis; I. First Part of the Challenge; II. Second Part of the Challenge; 5. Truthmaking; I. Question 1: Does Pursuit of the Truthmaker Project Require Acceptance of a Correspondence Theory of Truth Rather than a Deflationist Theory?
327   $aII. Question 2: Is There Good Reason to Think the Truthmaker Project will be Fruitful?III. Truthmaking without the Truthmaker Project; 6. The Liar Paradox; I. Illustrations of Supervenience; II. Categorial Preliminaries; III. An (Almost) General Account of Truth; IV. A Dilemma?; V. Comparison with Kripke's Account; Bibliography; Index
330   $aMcGrath argues for an original truth theory that combines elements of two well-known philosophical theories--deflationism and correspondence.
410  0$aStudies in philosophy (New York, N.Y.)
517 3 $aBetween deflationism and correspondence theory
606   $aTruth$xDeflationary theory
606   $aTruth$xCorrespondence theory
615  0$aTruth$xDeflationary theory.
615  0$aTruth$xCorrespondence theory.
676   $a121
700   $aMcGrath$b Matthew.$01532489
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910791097203321
996   $aBetween deflationism & correspondence theory$93778646
997   $aUNINA