LEADER 04627nam 2200757Ia 450 001 9910791081603321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8014-6861-2 010 $a1-322-50468-7 010 $a0-8014-6862-0 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801468629 035 $a(CKB)2550000001192981 035 $a(OCoLC)849949859 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10715673 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001035791 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11656929 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001035791 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11032540 035 $a(PQKB)10995846 035 $a(DE-B1597)527341 035 $a(OCoLC)1105910746 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801468629 035 $a(OCoLC)1227050256 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse58397 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138485 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10715673 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL681750 035 $a(OCoLC)922998408 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138485 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001192981 100 $a19901121e19891984 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe ideology of the offensive$b[electronic resource] $emilitary decision making and the disasters of 1914 /$fJack Snyder 210 $aIthaca, N.Y. $cCornell University Press$d1989, c1984 215 $a1 online resource (270 p.) 225 0 $aCornell studies in security affairs 225 0 $aCornell paperbacks 300 $aIncludes index. 311 $a0-8014-8244-5 311 $a0-8014-1657-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tIllustrations -- $tPreface -- $t1. Military Bias and Offensive Strategy -- $t2. France: Offensive Strategy as an Institutional Defense -- $t3. France: Du Picq, Dreyfus, and the Errors of Plan 17 -- $t4. Germany: The Elusive Formula for Decisive Victory -- $t5. Germany: The "Necessary" Is Possible -- $t6. Russia: Bureaucratic Politics and Strategic Priorities -- $t7. Russia: The Politics and Psychology of Overcommitment -- $t8. The Determinants of Military Strategy -- $tNotes -- $tSelected Bibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aJack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War offers new insight into the tragic miscalculations of that era and into their possible parallels in present-day war planning. By 1914, the European military powers had adopted offensive military strategies even though there was considerable evidence to support the notion that much greater advantage lay with defensive strategies. The author argues that organizational biases inherent in military strategists' attitudes make war more likely by encouraging offensive postures even when the motive is self-defense.Drawing on new historical evidence of the specific circumstances surrounding French, German, and Russian strategic policy, Snyder demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners. Snyder argues that the use of rational calculation often falls victim to the pursuit of organizational interests such as autonomy, prestige, growth, and wealth. Furthermore, efforts to justify the preferred policy bring biases into strategists' decisions-biases reflecting the influences of parochial interests and preconceptions, and those resulting from attempts to simplify unduly their analytical tasks.The frightening lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, because doctrine may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than to the implications of the prevailing weapons technology. By examining the historical failure of offensive doctrine, Jack Snyder makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the causes of war. 606 $aOffensive (Military science)$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aMilitary planning$zFrance$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aMilitary planning$zGermany$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aMilitary planning$zSoviet Union$xHistory$y20th century 606 $aWorld War, 1914-1918$xCampaigns 615 0$aOffensive (Military science)$xHistory 615 0$aMilitary planning$xHistory 615 0$aMilitary planning$xHistory 615 0$aMilitary planning$xHistory 615 0$aWorld War, 1914-1918$xCampaigns. 676 $a355.4/3/09034 700 $aSnyder$b Jack L$01499262 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910791081603321 996 $aThe ideology of the offensive$93779565 997 $aUNINA