LEADER 04556nam 2200793Ia 450 001 9910791043603321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4008-3262-4 010 $a9786613001269 010 $a1-283-00126-8 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400832620 035 $a(CKB)2550000001273112 035 $a(EBL)664617 035 $a(OCoLC)707067742 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000483079 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11303489 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000483079 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10527214 035 $a(PQKB)10150539 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000543138 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12192792 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000543138 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10518730 035 $a(PQKB)10453305 035 $a(OCoLC)730910176 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36881 035 $a(DE-B1597)446747 035 $a(OCoLC)979577112 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400832620 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL664617 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10448495 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL300126 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC664617 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000001273112 100 $a20050118d2005 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aBorrowing constitutional designs$b[electronic resource] $econstitutional law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic /$fCindy Skach 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc2005 215 $a1 online resource (168 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-14672-1 311 $a0-691-12345-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [129]-144) and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tTables and Figures -- $tPreface -- $tINTRODUCTION -- $tCHAPTER 1. Constitutional Frameworks and Constitutional Law -- $tCHAPTER 2. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in Ebert's Republic -- $tCHAPTER 3. Divided Minorities and Constitutional Dictatorship in Weimar Germany -- $tCHAPTER 4. Parties, Leaders, and Constitutional Law in de Gaulle's Republic -- $tCHAPTER 5. Consolidated Majorities and Constitutional Democracy in the French Fifth Republic -- $tCONCLUSION -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aAfter the collapse of communism, some thirty countries scrambled to craft democratic constitutions. Surprisingly, the constitutional model they most often chose was neither the pure parliamentary model found in most of Western Europe at the time, nor the presidential model of the Americas. Rather, it was semi-presidentialism--a rare model known more generally as the "French type." This constitutional model melded elements of pure presidentialism with those of pure parliamentarism. Specifically, semi-presidentialism combined a popularly elected head of state with a head of government responsible to a legislature. Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by new democracies. Drawing on rich case studies of two of the most important countries for European politics in the twentieth century--Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic--Cindy Skach offers the first theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy. She demonstrates that constitutional choice matters, because under certain conditions, semi-presidentialism structures incentives that make democratic consolidation difficult or that actually contribute to democratic collapse. She offers a new theory of constitutional design, integrating insights from law and the social sciences. In doing so, Skach challenges both democratic theory and democratic practice. This book will be welcomed not only by scholars and practitioners of constitutional law but also by those in fields such as comparative politics, European politics and history, and international and public affairs. 606 $aExecutive power 606 $aDemocracy 606 $aConstitutional history 606 $aDemocracy$zGermany$xHistory 606 $aDemocracy$zFrance$xHistory 615 0$aExecutive power. 615 0$aDemocracy. 615 0$aConstitutional history. 615 0$aDemocracy$xHistory. 615 0$aDemocracy$xHistory. 676 $a320.943/09/042 700 $aSkach$b Cindy$f1967-$01547900 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910791043603321 996 $aBorrowing constitutional designs$93804493 997 $aUNINA