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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
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200 10$aKnowledge, thought, and the case for dualism /$fRichard Fumerton, University of Iowa$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2013.
215   $a1 online resource (xv, 283 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
225 1 $aCambridge studies in philosophy
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a1-107-03787-5 
311   $a1-306-07186-0 
327   $aPreface -- 1. Setting the stage -- 2. Distinctions: versions of physicalism and dualism -- 3. Ontological priorities: taking phenomenology seriously -- 4. Knowledge arguments revisited -- 5. Indirect thought and informative identity -- 6. An ontologically liberating skepticism: the last hope for physicalism -- 7. Objections and replies -- 8. The ubiquitous self: a brief postscript.
330   $aThe relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
410  0$aCambridge studies in philosophy.
517 3 $aKnowledge, Thought, & the Case for Dualism
606   $aDualism
606   $aMaterialism
606   $aMind and body
615  0$aDualism.
615  0$aMaterialism.
615  0$aMind and body.
676   $a147/.4
686   $aPHI004000$2bisacsh
700   $aFumerton$b Richard A.$f1949-$01494246
801  0$bUkCbUP
801  1$bUkCbUP
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910790614103321
996   $aKnowledge, thought, and the case for dualism$93717672
997   $aUNINA