LEADER 03202nam 2200589 a 450 001 9910790475103321 005 20230801221557.0 010 $a1-280-49714-9 010 $a9786613592378 010 $a94-012-0725-9 024 7 $a10.1163/9789401207256 035 $a(CKB)2670000000148335 035 $a(EBL)943852 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000645865 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11388916 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000645865 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10682036 035 $a(PQKB)10324354 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC943852 035 $a(OCoLC)785785354 035 $a(nllekb)BRILL9789401207256 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL943852 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10535706 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL359237 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000148335 100 $a20120309d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aFriendship$b[electronic resource] $ea central moral value /$fMichael H. Mitias 210 $aAmsterdam $cRodopi$d2012 215 $a1 online resource (239 p.) 225 1 $aValue inquiry book series ;$vv. 239 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a90-420-3438-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aPreliminary Material -- THESIS AND PLAN OF THE BOOK -- CONCEPT OF MORAL PARADIGM -- MORAL PARADIGMS IN HELLENIC AND HELLENISTIC CULTURES -- FRIENDSHIP IN HELLENIC AND HELLENISTIC MORAL THEORY -- FRIENDSHIP IN MEDIEVAL MORAL THEORY -- FRIENDSHIP IN MODERN MORAL THEORY -- FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEORY -- FRIENDSHIP AS AN ONTOLOGICAL NEED -- NOTES -- ABOUT THE AUTHOR -- WORKS CITED -- INDEX -- VIBS. 330 $aFriendship was recognized as a central moral value in the classical period, but it was dismissed from medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. This book argues that this dismissal is unjustifiable. The validity of this claim is established in four steps. First, it proposes the concept of moral paradigm. This concept enables us to explore the source of moral value and to provide a criterion for the evaluation of the adequacy of moral theory. Second, the book explains why medieval, modern and twentieth century moral theorists neglected friendship as a central moral value in their analysis of moral behavior and why this neglect was unjustifiable. Third, it explains why the classical moral philosophers viewed friendship as a central moral value. Fourth, it argues that friendship is an ontological need, therefore, a necessary condition of the moral life. This need is implicitly recognized in the moral paradigms that underlie the moral theories of the medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. Accordingly it cannot be neglected in the process of moral theorizing. 410 0$aValue inquiry book series ;$vv. 239. 606 $aFriendship$xPhilosophy 615 0$aFriendship$xPhilosophy. 676 $a177.62 700 $aMitias$b Michael H$0851735 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910790475103321 996 $aFriendship$93811931 997 $aUNINA