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035   $a(DE-B1597)9781400842513
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100   $a20110930d2012      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 10$aWhy adjudicate?$b[electronic resource] $eenforcing trade rules in the WTO /$fChristina L. Davis
205   $aCourse Book
210   $aPrinceton, NJ $cPrinceton University Press$d2012
215   $a1 online resource (345 p.)
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a0-691-15275-6 
311   $a0-691-15276-4 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tFigures -- $tTables -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tAbbreviations -- $t1. Introduction -- $t2. Domestic Constraints And Active Enforcement -- $t3. The Democratic Propensity For Adjudication -- $t4. The Litigious State: U.S. Trade Policy -- $t5. The Reluctant Litigant: Japanese Trade Policy -- $t6. Conflict Management: Evaluating The Effectiveness Of Adjudication -- $t7. Level Playing Field? Adjudication By Developing Countries -- $t8. Conclusion -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex
330   $aThe World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. Davis establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.
606   $aForeign trade regulation
606   $aAdministrative procedure
610   $aChina.
610   $aJapan.
610   $aJapanese trade policy.
610   $aPeru.
610   $aU.S. Congress.
610   $aU.S. trade policy.
610   $aUnited States.
610   $aVietnam.
610   $aWTO.
610   $aWorld Trade Organization.
610   $aaccountability.
610   $aadjudication.
610   $abargaining.
610   $abureaucracy.
610   $aconflict.
610   $acooperation.
610   $acourts.
610   $adelegation of authority.
610   $ademocracy.
610   $ademocratic politics.
610   $adeveloping countries.
610   $adispute settlement.
610   $adomestic constraints.
610   $adomestic politics.
610   $aexports.
610   $aforeign economic policy.
610   $afree trade.
610   $ageopolitics.
610   $aindustry lobbying.
610   $ainternational politics.
610   $ainternational relations.
610   $ainternational trade law.
610   $ainternational trade.
610   $alabeling.
610   $alegalization.
610   $aliberalization.
610   $apoliticization.
610   $atrade barriers.
610   $atrade disputes.
610   $atrade law enforcement.
610   $atrade policy.
610   $atrade.
615  0$aForeign trade regulation.
615  0$aAdministrative procedure.
676   $a382/.92
686   $aMK 8650$qBVB$2rvk
700   $aDavis$b Christina L.$f1971-$01462562
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910790181003321
996   $aWhy adjudicate$93671583
997   $aUNINA