LEADER 04168oam 2200649I 450 001 9910789983003321 005 20230126204845.0 010 $a1-136-73759-6 010 $a1-283-10337-0 010 $a9786613103376 010 $a1-136-73760-X 010 $a0-203-81864-4 024 7 $a10.4324/9780203818640 035 $a(CKB)2670000000090993 035 $a(EBL)672398 035 $a(OCoLC)721907181 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000543773 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11334700 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000543773 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10534257 035 $a(PQKB)11424677 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC672398 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL672398 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10533787 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL310337 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000090993 100 $a20180706d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aGame theory in the social sciences $ea reader-friendly guide /$fLuca Lambertini 210 1$aLondon :$cRoutledge,$d2011. 215 $a1 online resource (209 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-415-66483-7 311 $a0-415-59111-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aGame Theory in the Social Sciences: A reader-friendly guide; Copyright; Contents; List of figures; Preface; 1 The origins: a bit of history; 1.1 Giant steps; 1.2 Hidden truths?; 2 What is a game?; 2.1 The structure of a game; 2.2 A brief taxonomy of games; 2.3 Alternative representations; 3 Solving a game; 3.1 The maximin (or minimax) equilibrium; 3.2 Refinements of the Nash equilibrium; 3.3 Warnings; 3.4 Risk dominance; 3.5 Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies; 3.6 Appendix: Schro?dinger's paradox; 4 Understanding economics; 4.1 Industrial economics; 4.2 Monetary and fiscal policies 327 $a4.3 Natural resources and the environment5 Repeated games and collusivebehaviour; 5.1 The prisoners' dilemma revisited; 5.2 Time and time discounting; 5.3 Finite or infinite horizon?; 5.4 The folk theorems; 5.5 The chain store paradox; 6 Understanding politics; 6.1 Voting paradoxes; 6.2 A spatial model of political competition; 6.3 The robustness of the median voter theorem; 6.4 Electoral campaigns; 6.5 How about being re-elected?; 7 Wargames; 7.1 The battle of the Bismarck Sea; 7.2 Overlord; 7.3 Escalation as an all-pay auction; 7.4 Mutually assured destruction and the Cuban missile crisis 327 $a7.5 The Euromissiles crisis7.6 Hawks, doves and Star Wars; 8 Trade, security and hegemony; 8.1 International cooperation and free trade; 8.2 Guns versus butter and the trade-off betweenopenness and security; 8.3 The persistence of unipolarism; 8.4 Appendix: the game between satellites; 9 The role of information; 9.1 Asymmetric information; 9.2 Incomplete information; 9.3 Forward induction; 9.4 Appendix: Bayes' rule; 10 Bargaining and cooperation; 10.1 Bargaining games: the axiomatic approach; 10.2 Cooperative games: a matter of coalitions; 10.3 Examples; Notes; Bibliography; Index 330 $aIndividuals, firms, governments and nations behave strategically, for good and bad. Over the last few decades, game theory has been constructed and progressively refined to become the major tool used by social scientists to understand, predict and regulate strategic interaction among agents who often have conflicting interests. In the surprisingly anodyne jargon of the theory, they 'play games'. This book offers an introduction to the basic tools of game theory and an overview of a number of applications to real-world cases, covering the areas of economics, politics and international relati 606 $aGame theory 606 $aSocial sciences$xMethodology 615 0$aGame theory. 615 0$aSocial sciences$xMethodology. 676 $a300.1/5193 676 $a300.15193 700 $aLambertini$b Luca.$081232 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910789983003321 996 $aGame theory in the social sciences$93706275 997 $aUNINA